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Introduction
The overarching theme of this thesis is how information frictions affect expectations
formation, and its implications for monetary and fiscal policymaking. Why is that
important? Economic agents, such as firms and households, attempt to infer the cur-
rent state of the economy when making decisions, which is typically not observable in
real-time. If their ability to assess current economic conditions (or in economic terms,
nowcasts) vary over time, it may affect the way they respond to various shocks, such
as monetary and fiscal shocks.
I answer this broad question empirically and theoretically. Empirically, I use sev-
eral methodologies and proxy the degree of information frictions with the Survey of
Professional Forecasters — in particular, the dispersion of their nowcasts (‘disagree-
ment’). How can one think of this proxy? A significant amount of disagreement by
professional forecasters on a near-term forecast indicates a period of when it is diffi-
cult to observe the current state of the economy, or in other words, there is high in-
formation rigidities. Theoretically, I explore two styles of information friction models
(rational inattention and sticky information) for firms’ price-setting and households’
consumption-saving behaviour.
In Chapter 1, I investigate the heterogeneity of monetary policy transmission un-
der time-varying disagreement. Empirically, I establish that during high disagree-
ment periods, prices respond more sluggishly in response to (various measures of)
monetary shocks. These stickier prices cause a flatter Phillips curve, leading to the
empirical result that monetary policy has stronger real (output) effects. I also develop
a tractable theoretical model that show rationally inattentive price-setters produce this
result. The rational inattention model contains two theoretical predictions. One, how
disagreement across of rationally inattentive price-setters changes when various pa-
rameters (that models information frictions) change. Two, how the response of ratio-
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nally inattentive price-setters to a monetary shock changes when the same parameters
change. The rational inattention model also highlights the fundamental differences
between uncertainty and disagreement, bridging the results of this chapter with the
literature on uncertainty.
While there are many models on information frictions to explain its effects on
the transmission of monetary shocks, there is surprisingly little on its role on fiscal
shocks. In Chapters 2 and 3, I investigate the effects of fiscal shocks on macroeco-
nomic variables and the role of information frictions. Currently, there is still a lack of
consensus on how consumption responds to a government spending shock. Typical
neoclassical real business cycle (RBC) models predict that consumption should fall
to an expansionary government spending shock, but other (more Keynesian) models
suggest that consumption rises instead. A key takeaway from this debate is that the
forward-lookingness of households is an important determinant of how a government
spending shock propagates, as it influences how Ricardian the households are.
In Chapter 2, I empirically show that the effects of fiscal policy can be state-
dependent due to changes in information frictions. I document a novel result that rec-
onciles the Keynesian and neoclassical predictions of fiscal policy. I use a non-linear
local projections framework and combine it with the insights of the previous chapter
— using professional forecasters’ disagreement as a measure of information frictions.
The key finding is that during periods of high information frictions, households act
less Ricardian (as they are less forward-looking), and thus government spending co-
moves with consumption. In contrast, during low information frictions, households
act sufficiently Ricardian such that consumption falls in response to a government
spending rise. Another important result highlights that firms and households pay
heterogeneous attention to different components of government spending and trans-
fer payment shocks. Thus, fiscal policymakers will benefit from understanding how
information frictions affect the decision making process of firms and households in
order to use different tools that best achieve their policy goals.
In Chapter 3, I provide a theoretical quantitative framework to the empirical find-
ings of Chapter 2, on how information frictions could affect the consumption response
to a government spending shock. In particular, I build on a general equilibrium model
with sticky information, and add households with limited asset market participation
2
(‘rule-of-thumb’ or ’hand-to-mouth’ households). When information frictions are not
severe, many households are able to identify a government spending shock and thus,
their Ricardian effects dominate the rule-of-thumb households leading to a fall in ag-
gregate consumption. In contrast, when information frictions impede their ability to
identify the shock, only few households save in advance of higher future taxes and
therefore, aggregate consumption rises.
What can policymakers take away from this thesis? Lower disagreement across
agents is ideal when implementing disinflationary monetary policies. Improved cen-
tral bank communication may help reduce disagreement among economic agents that
could lead to a reduction of the sacrifice ratio. In other words, it helps reduce output
losses for a given fall in inflation. In addition, expectations formation gives rise to
a novel channel of monetary and fiscal policy interaction. Monetary policy has long
used communications to shape expectations on future economic conditions. For ex-
ample, most advanced economy central banks publish some kind of forecast for both
inflation and real output. If these communications are successful in influencing ex-
pectations — and in particular, decreasing disagreement on future economic conditions
— monetary policy communications could reduce the stimulative power of an expan-
sionary fiscal policy shock (and likewise, reduce the output losses of a contractionary
fiscal shock).
However, note that this is purely a positive, rather than normative, question. If
central banks do not communicate sufficiently, it may reduce the effectiveness of mon-
etary policy, which could remain the primary demand-management tool for advanced
economies. Additionally, even without the monetary policy benefits, keeping infor-
mation frictions high could still be welfare sub-optimal. For example, it makes it more
difficult for households to smooth consumption in anticipation to all other economic
shocks, including fiscal policy.
3
Chapter 1
Real and Nominal Effects of Monetary
Shocks under Time-Varying
Disagreement
“Much of the dispersion in beliefs can be explained by firms’ incentives to
collect and process information, i.e. rational inattention motives.”
— Olivier Coibion, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Saten Kumar (2015)
“... the literature has convincingly shown that disagreement is not
uncertainty. They are conceptually different.”
— Ricardo Reis, ECB Forum in Central Banking, Sintra (June 2018)
1.1 Introduction
A noticeable feature of survey data is the remarkable range of disagreement on vari-
ous forecasts of macroeconomic variables across different economic agents.1 Andrade
et al. (2016) find these disagreement to be time-varying at all horizons. The intuition
behind the stylised facts is that economic agents are not fully informed all the time,
and thus, naturally creates heterogeneity in beliefs that inherently changes over time.
The literature highlights this observation is consistent with the predictions arising
from information frictions model (Andrade et al., 2016; Falck et al., 2019; Mankiw
et al., 2004).
1As noted by Ricardo Reis in ECB Forum in Central Banking, Sintra (June 2018) during his discus-
sion on “Inflation expectations – a policy tool?” (Coibion et al., 2018b).
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This paper’s primary research question examines how varying degrees of dis-
agreement affect the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Economic agents
are not only forward-looking, but in reality, households and firms also try to infer
the current state of the economy when making decisions. If their ability to assess
the current economic conditions (nowcasts) varies over time, it may affect their abil-
ity to respond to various shocks, including monetary shocks. A period of significant
nowcast disagreement across agents indicates of when it is difficult to observe the
current economic state – in other words, when there is high information rigidities. I
examine real output nowcast disagreement because people often think about economic
growth prospects when making decisions.2 For example, households worry about
their (un)employment chances, and firms optimise prices given demand conditions.
Consequently, current output expectations would also matter to monetary policymak-
ers.
The contribution of this paper is two-fold. The main contribution is, using vari-
ous empirical approaches and a measure of disagreement across professional forecast-
ers, to empirically document how during heightened disagreement, monetary policy
has smaller effect over inflation, yet more influence over output. But first, I design a
tractable rational-inattention model to examine how price-setting might change with
varying information frictions. The model also dissects the relationship between dis-
agreement and uncertainty – two fundamentally different concepts – to highlight how
they distinctly affect monetary transmission, and when there is a positive link between
them (or when they break down).
What differentiates disagreement and uncertainty measures? Heightened uncer-
tainty since the global financial crisis has spurred a large collective effort in measur-
ing economic uncertainty. A previous and established literature proxied uncertainty
with the disagreement of individual forecasts in surveys (Bomberger, 1996; Lahiri and
Sheng, 2010). However, the contemporary literature considers uncertainty and dis-
agreement as fundamentally different concepts, as I also show in the tractable model.
Empirically, various measures of macroeconomic uncertainty and disagreement have
positive, but weak, correlations (Kozeniauskas et al., 2018).3
2This paper complements the literature that has largely focused on how inflation expectations dis-
agreement affect monetary transmission as discussed in Section 1.2.
3’Disagreement’ in this paper is close to the Kozeniauskas et al. (2018) definition of ‘higher-order
uncertainty’.
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I utilise the tractable model to examine how uncertainty and disagreement con-
cepts affect price-setting behaviour of firms, and thus, the effect of monetary policy
on central banks’ goal variables. While uncertainty has been looked at extensively,
the question remains, how does disagreement about current economic conditions
amongst agents affect their response to monetary shocks? As with many other imper-
fect information models, the rational inattention model suggests that when firms are
only able to imperfectly observe factors that affect their optimal prices, they attach a
positive (but less than unity) weight to the signals they receive (the ‘Kalman gain’) on
these factors. This implies that their prices respond sluggishly to aggregate monetary
shocks. The slower prices respond, the more ‘sticky’ prices appear, leading to a flatter
Phillips curve. Thus output would correspondingly react by more to the monetary
shock.
A novel insight from the rational inattention model is that plausible causes of
the variation in disagreement has different effects on how price-setters respond to
monetary shocks, in comparison to uncertainty. For example, a reduction in firms’
information processing capacity worsens the quality of information available, leading
firms to attach less weight to signals they receive.4 Prices would then be more sluggish
and disagreement increases. Note that this is the case even when the fundamental
uncertainty on macroeconomic outcomes has not changed, illustrating one of the cases
where uncertainty and disagreement do not co-move together.
Another insight from the rational inattention model is that endogenous optimal at-
tention allocation could cause disagreement to change non-monotonically in response
to fluctuations in aggregate uncertainty. In particular, an increase in demand uncer-
tainty raises the benefits to monitoring demand conditions. Firms could optimally
re-allocate much more attention to monitoring demand, and actually decrease dis-
agreement of the assessment of demand across different firms.
These results also shed light on how increased communication by monetary poli-
cymakers can affect their ability to deliver on their stabilisation objectives. There is a
recent trend of vastly increased central bank transparency — from releasing detailed
minutes of monetary policy deliberations, increased frequency of speeches, to devel-
oping material more easily accessible to the general public (for example, the Bank
4For example, the reduction of information available to a firm from the bankruptcy of a supplier
or customer.
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of England’s Monetary Policy Report infographics).5 However, much of the literature
focuses on how inflation expectations helps anchoring inflation. The mechanism that
explains the empirical results in this paper suggests that, in addition, communicating
aggregate real conditions can help central banks achieve their objectives. As improved
communication helps economic agents form expectations about current and future
conditions, this reduces the disagreement of agents and potentially lowers the sac-
rifice ratio. With disinflationary monetary policies, inflation can be reduced with
smaller output losses.
Empirically, I employ non-linear methods to answer the research question. In the
baseline exercise, I use a threshold vector autoregression that allows macroeconomic
variables to have different response given varying disagreement. The general idea of
the empirical threshold VAR methodology is to pick an endogenous ‘threshold vari-
able’ that contains information about the different regimes (Tsay, 1998) — in this case,
high and low disagreement. It is important to note that the threshold variable in this
paper is endogenous, and thus allows for endogenous regime switching. As will be
discussed in greater detail, the threshold variable (disagreement) is the dispersion of
the cross-sectional real GDP nowcasts from the U.S. Survey of Professional Forecasters
(SPF).
Furthermore, the main results are robust to alternative monetary policy shock
identification schemes. I construct a narratively-identified monetary policy shock se-
ries, by extending Romer and Romer (2004) up to 2013 (when the Greenbook fore-
casts have been published). The shock identification allows for non-linearities in the
monetary policy reaction function according to disagreement. I apply the narrative
monetary policy shocks with a threshold VAR approach, as well as state-dependent
local projections.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 summarises the related literature.
Section 1.3 presents the theoretical model that elucidates the fine distinction between
uncertainty and disagreement, and their implications for pricing behaviour. Section
1.4 describes the data, measure of disagreement and econometric methodology, and
highlights the main empirical results. The extension in Sections 1.5 and 1.6 explores
5Following Geraats (2002), the literature distinguishes various types of central bank transparency.
Recently, Dincer et al. (2019) illustrate how prominent central banks, including the U.S. Federal Reserve,
have deployed greater transparency as a policy tool in the aftermath of the financial crisis.
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the narratively-identified monetary policy shocks, and local projections as an alterna-
tive empirical methodology. In Section 1.7, I conclude and provide policy implications
of the results.
1.2 Literature Review
This paper contributes to three strands of literature. First, it contributes to the vast and
growing empirical literature on state-dependent effects of monetary policy shocks.
Second, it complements the literature on disagreement about expectations, that has
largely focus on inflation expectations. Third, it builds on the literature in explaining
time-varying disagreement through the lens of a theoretical model with information
frictions (in particular, rational inattention).
The main empirical results of this paper sit in between the argument about the
strength of monetary policy in different economic regimes, such as time-varying
uncertainty, and booms and recessions. Caggiano et al. (2014) and Tenreyro and
Thwaites (2016) find that monetary shocks have less impact on output and prices in
recessions, while others such as Peersman and Smets (2001) and Lo and Piger (2005)
find the opposite — i.e. there appears little agreement across the literature. Similarly,
the literature on monetary transmission under uncertainty also find monetary policy
could either be less or more effective in affecting output (and prices) in high uncer-
tainty (Castelnuovo and Pellegrino, 2018; Aastveit et al., 2017) or, it may have stronger
impact on real output (Park, 2019).
In terms of empirical methodology, this paper closest to Castelnuovo and Pelle-
grino (2018) and Park (2019) in using threshold VAR to study the state-dependent
effects of monetary policy shocks. However, a key difference with my paper is that
their threshold variable (or the interaction term in Aastveit et al. (2017)) are treated
as an exogenous variable — such that their uncertainty measures cannot react to
monetary policy shocks. In practice, as shown by Pellegrino (2018), uncertainty can
indeed respond to monetary policy shocks — indicating the importance of allowing
the threshold variable to be endogenous.6
Specifically, this paper complements the literature looking at the effects of mone-
6In line with the literature, I also compute the impulse responses using GIRFs which accounts for
the endogenous threshold variable that creates non-linearities in the threshold model.
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tary policy shocks under time-varying disagreement, that has largely focus on inflation
expectations disagreement. Falck et al. (2019) examine disagreement in forecasts about
future inflation and its interaction with monetary policy effectiveness. Using one-
quarter ahead inflation forecasts in the SPF, they find that in the high disagreement
regime, inflation and inflation expectations respond relatively weakly to monetary
policy shocks — showing a large ‘price-puzzle’, while the response of output are not
statistically different in the two regimes.
Moreover, the literature on disagreement presents stylised facts about main macroe-
conomic variables, including output, in long- and short-run predictions (Andrade
et al., 2016; Dovern et al., 2012; Patton and Timmermann, 2010). It also offers var-
ious theoretical explanations for the time-varying disagreement using models with
different information frictions. Andrade et al. (2016) and Falck et al. (2019) show that
their empirical observation is consistent with predictions from dispersed information
models, while Mankiw et al. (2004), Andrade and Le Bihan (2013) and Coibion et al.
(2018a) use recent models of inattention due to sticky information á la Mankiw and
Reis (2002) and rational inattention á la Sims (2003).
The disagreement (cross-sectional forecast dispersion) measure is related to recent
empirical work that measure aggregate volatility. This approach builds on a long lit-
erature, for example Baker et al. (2016) and D’Amico and Orphanides (2008), to study
the direct effect of uncertainty shocks (rather than the indirect impact on monetary
transmission). It is important to note, as I highlight in the next section, the relation-
ship between uncertainty and disagreement is not always monotonic, and thus, the
results from the uncertainty literature do not necessarily conflict with the disagree-
ment results in this paper. Kozeniauskas et al. (2018) emphasise the importance in
distinguishing the different uncertainty measures. In the recent uncertainty literature
in understanding monetary policy transmission, authors most often use ‘macro un-
certainty’ — uncertainty about aggregate variable such as Jurado et al. (2015) or VIX.
Whereas the disagreement measure in this paper is related closer to the concept of
‘higher-order uncertainty’ that is defined as the uncertainty (shocks) about others’ be-
liefs arising when forecasts differ. Although they are positively correlated, as shown
later in the paper, their relationship could break down.7
7The other category of uncertainty in Kozeniauskas et al. (2018) is ‘micro dispersion’, as dispersion of
firm outcomes often proxies for micro uncertainty (an increase in the variance of idiosyncratic shocks
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The analysis of this paper is closest to Zhang (2017) who investigates endogenous
information processing capacity (rational inattention) as a channel through which un-
certainty affects pricing dynamics, and empirically tests it with a Markov-switching
FAVAR. The key mechanism of the model is that with higher uncertainty, firms would
exert more effort into monitoring the economic state. The higher degree of attentive-
ness lets firms detect (monetary) shocks more promptly and more accurately, thus
allowing the effects of the shocks to be less persistent. Theoretically, I expand on
her model to examine the implications on disagreement on the allocation of atten-
tion, and its links with aggregate uncertainty. In Zhang’s setup, the attention paid
to a particular variable only depends on the prior uncertainty of the variable itself,
and the aggregate marginal cost of attention. In contrast, in my tractable model, be-
cause the agent has to allocate its finite attention, the relative variance across different
variables also matter. Empirically, the main difference of this paper’s threshold VAR
methodology and Markov-switching approach is that the latter examine the whole
model for structural breaks. The threshold variable pins down the regimes, which
enables the threshold VAR to specifically differentiate across disagreement regimes.
Zhang shows the Markov-switching model picks up the large regime change from the
Great Inflation to the Great Moderation period, but I show that there is variation in
disagreement regimes even within the Great Moderation period.
Naturally, this paper contributes to the rational inattention literature to study the
effects of monetary shocks. For example, Menkulasi (2009) considers a dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium model in which firms optimally allocate their limited attention across
aggregate and idiosyncratic states. The model shows an increase in the volatility of
aggregate shocks causes an optimal re-allocation of attention to the aggregate envi-
ronment. Additionally, there is a fast growing literature on designing rational inatten-
tion models to understand monetary policy transmission (amongst many, Sims (2010),
Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2009) and Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2015)). However,
these mechanisms have not been utilised much to explain the empirical evidence of
state-dependent monetary transmission. Thus, this paper narrows the gap in the lit-
to firm). Vavra (2013) finds expansionary monetary policy leads to an increase in aggregate price
flexibility and is less effective at increasing real output during periods of higher volatility — measured
using firm-specific or micro uncertainty. The different measures of ‘state’ between this paper and
Vavra’s explain the different findings, and thus called for distinct mechanisms (he focuses on (S,s)
price-setting models).
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erature by applying the mechanisms from rational inattention models to analyse the
non-linear effects of monetary policy.
1.3 Stylised Rational Inattention Model
To illustrate the mechanisms that generate the empirical results, I present a stylised
price-setting model with rational inattention, with closed-form solutions that allow
me to compute comparative statics. I analyse how disagreement endogenously evolve
to changes in information processing of firms and various uncertainties relevant for
pricing decisions, and how that relates to how monetary shocks affect optimal prices.8
In this model, the price-setters in the firms face an unobserved aggregate demand
yt, composed of a normally-distributed demand shock bt, and a ‘monetary policy’
component c · rt. The demand shock has a variance σ2b , which I refer to as fundamental
demand uncertainty.9 For tractability, without the loss of generality, the demand
shock is assumed to be mean-zero. The monetary policy component is fully known:
price-setters observe the policy rate rt and the interest-elasticity of demand c > 0.
yt = bt − c · rt, where bt ∼ N(0, σ2b ) (1.1)
In this simple model, I assume demand is insensitive to prices, leading to a flat de-
mand curve. The full-information optimal price p∗it purely depends on the marginal
costs, which is increasing with respect to demand yt, and decreasing to an unob-
served, stochastic firm-specific productivity term ait where i represents a firm.
p∗it = ϕyt − ait, where ait ∼ N(0, σ2a ) (1.2)
This simple structure can be micro-founded by a profit-maximising firm with decreas-
ing returns to scale (thus marginal costs are increasing in output) that is common with
rational inattention models, or a firm that faces labour market rigidities (thus needs
8The model is partially based on the simple model in Zhang (2017), but I add more economic
structure and different informational structure to aid interpretation. The analysis focuses on the be-
haviour of disagreement to changes in uncertainty and how rationally inattentive price-setters respond
to monetary shocks.
9The simplifying assumption that the shock is white noise, enabling us to get analytical solutions, as
the optimal information decision is independent across time periods. We abstract away from dynamics,
as we are interested in the intratemporal attention allocation.
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to pay higher wages to produce more output).




it} on key variables:




it ∼ N(0, σ
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εy,t) (1.3)




it ∼ N(0, σ2εa,t) (1.4)
The firms choose the variance of the noise on the two signals, but this decision is
subject to an information constraint:10
I (p∗it; sit) = H (p
∗
it)− H (p∗it | sit) ≤ K (1.5)
where the firms are limited to how much entropy H(·) they could reduce on the
two state variables bt and ait after observing the signal sit. Given that the signals are
























where Kyit and K
a
it are the entropy reduction to the uncertainty on the two unobserved
state variables. Hereafter, I will refer to Kyit and K
a
it as the ‘attention’ firm i allocates to
monitoring yt and ait, which will be chosen optimally.
Rearranging Eq (1.6), the attention allocations imply the following perceived volatil-













In other words, the more attention paid to each variable, the associated variance of
the noise on the signals would be lower. As the signals are i.i.d., and the only source
of information on yt is s
y
it, any dispersion in the expectations of yt across firms i
10Notice that the firms do not receive signals about other firms idiosyncratic shocks, or public
signals, and thus do not create higher-order signal extraction problems.
11I leave the details of the derivation in Appendix A.1.
12
is captured by σ2εy,t . Thus, σ
2
εy,t is a sufficient summary statistic of demand nowcast
disagreement.
In the Zhang (2017) model, K is pinned down by ensuring the marginal benefit of
information equates to a fixed marginal cost of information, as the firms ‘purchase’
information with a linear cost in K. This model has a small, but important, depar-
ture by assuming maximum information gain constraint K is exogenous to the firm.
This makes it more tractable to see the impact of changes in uncertainty of different
variables, as well as changes in the information capacity, on attention allocation and
price-setting.
1.3.1 Optimal Pricing and Attention Allocation
Each firm i minimises the expected profit losses due to mispricing by setting prices









subject to Kyit + K
a
it ≤ K (1.9)
As Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2009) show, minimising the quadratic loss around
the full-information optimal price subject to information constraints is equivalent to
profit-maximisation. The quadratic loss function is symmetric, so it is trivial to show
that the optimal price is the firms’ best guess of what the true optimal price is given
the signal it receives:




− E [ait | sait] (1.10)
As in Zhang (2017), the model is solved by a backward two-step procedure. Firstly,
the optimal price is solved for a given attention allocation {Kyit, K
a
it}. Secondly, I use
the result from the first step to substitute for the profit loss (from the optimal profit)
in the firm’s objective as a function of the information choice. The attention allocation
decision can then be solved by optimising the objective.
The optimal price setting decision for a given attention allocation can be inferred
from standard Bayesian updating and the pricing rule Eq (1.10). Rearranging it, we
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This optimal pricing behaviour substituted into the expected profit loss due to mis-












it σ2b + 2
−2Kait σ2a (1.14)
where the last equality (1.14) results from the prior variances σ2y = σ2b , as the monetary
policy component of demand c · rt is observable. Substituting the maximum informa-
tion gain constraint, it is trivial to show the expected profit loss is strictly convex for
any finite and strictly positive combination of {σ2b , σ2a}. Thus, there exists a unique

























The optimal attention allocation results are very intuitive: the attention paid to de-
mand is increasing with the total attention available K and the uncertainty surround-
ing demand σb (as higher demand uncertainty increases the benefits to monitoring
demand conditions yt), while decreasing in productivity uncertainty σa. The last re-
sult suggests that an increase in productivity uncertainty would make firms reallocate
attention away from monitoring demand conditions. This contrasts to Zhang (2017),
where in that model the attention paid to a variable depends only on the prior vari-
ance of the variable itself and the marginal cost of attention.13
12See Appendix A.1 for details of the derivation.
13In Zhang (2017) model, an increase in (the equivalent of) demand uncertainty would mean firms
increase K, to ensure that the marginal benefit of attention equates the exogenous marginal cost.
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1.3.2 Comparative Statics: Disagreement
As we have now solved for the optimal attention allocation, in this subsection, we
examine how disagreement of demand conditions σ2εy,t responds to changes in: (1)
total attention available K, (2) productivity uncertainty σ2a , and (3) demand uncertainty
σ2b . In the next subsection, we examine the price reaction to monetary policy shocks
in response to changes in the aforementioned parameters.
Firstly, for demand disagreement, we revisit Eq (1.7). From this equation, it is
clear that disagreement is a function of (exogenous) fundamental uncertainty, but







Substituting in the optimal attention allocation and differentiating it with respect to








































The first two derivatives, Eq (1.17) and (1.18), are simple and fairly intuitive: changes
in total information processing available to firms K and productivity uncertainty σ2a
only affect demand disagreement only through the endogenous response of attention
Kyit. A lowering of the total information processing capacity of firms lead firms to
pay less attention to aggregate demand (as well as productivity), leading to a poorer
quality of information and thus increased disagreement across firms. Similarly, an
increase of fundamental idiosyncratic productivity uncertainty lead firms to reallocate
attention away from monitoring aggregate demand conditions, which also increase
demand disagreement.
The more interesting case is what happens when fundamental demand uncer-








2 . In other words, when attention on aggre-
gate demand is relatively high, fundamental demand uncertainty positively co-moves
with demand disagreement, but when attention is relatively low, uncertainty and
disagreement negatively co-move. This is because there are two opposing forces: a
direct effect of an increase in fundamental uncertainty, and an indirect effect from the
endogenous re-allocation of attention towards monitoring demand. When attention
is relatively low, the re-allocation of attention towards aggregate demand conditions
could be strong enough that it overturns the direct effect (as the marginal benefits of
re-allocating attention towards demand is high).
Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2009) argue that to explain the sluggish response of
prices to aggregate monetary shocks, it must be that idiosyncratic productivity mat-
ters a lot more for firm profits than demand uncertainty (σ2a  σ2b ), implying that
firms pay little attention to aggregate conditions. While my model is clearly not
quantitative, the Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2009) result at least points to the plau-
sibility of negative co-movement between uncertainty and disagreement. Empirically,
Kozeniauskas et al. (2018) document that the correlation between various uncertainty
and disagreement measures are quite low.
1.3.3 Comparative Statics: Price Setting
This subsection returns to the key research question: how do prices respond to mon-
etary shocks under different conditions? By combining Eq (1.10) and syit = yt + ε
y
it =























where we derive the second line by substituting in Ky∗it from Eq (1.15). Intuitively,
firms set lower prices as demand falls (as full-information optimal prices also fall).
However, the extent that this occurs depends on the level of attention on aggregate
demand conditions.
Taking the second-order comparative statics of Eq (1.21) with respect to the same
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parameters in the previous subsection:
d2pit
drtdK
= − ln(2) σa
ϕσb













2−K ϕc < 0 (1.24)
These results are also fairly intuitive: prices are less responsive to monetary shocks
when firms pay less attention. This could be generated by: (1) a reduction in total
information processing capacity, (2) an increase in productivity uncertainty, or (3) a
decrease in aggregate demand uncertainty.
The key takeaway from this simple model is that the mechanisms of increased
disagreement and uncertainty to the monetary transmission mechanism can be very
different, and thus explain why the results with disagreement regimes contrast with
those in the literature on uncertainty. For example, a reduction of information pro-
cessing capability of agents raises disagreement and weakens monetary policy, but
this change has no effect on fundamental uncertainty. Meanwhile, an increase in
productivity uncertainty also increases demand disagreement, and the same time, re-
duces the effectiveness of monetary policy. But a decrease in demand uncertainty could




I obtained quarterly data of real GDP, GDP deflator, commodity price index and effec-
tive Federal Funds Rate from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database, for
the sample period of 1970Q1 to 2018Q4. Real GDP and GDP deflator are measures of
economic activity and prices, sourced from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and are
seasonally adjusted. I include a commodity price index to control for energy and food
price shocks, and capture supply side factors that may influence output and prices.
This data is from the Bureau of Labour Statistics, and is originally not seasonally ad-
17
justed.14 The choice of these variables is standard in the empirical literature studying
monetary policy transmission as noted by Christiano et al. (1996), Sims (1992), and
Bernanke and Gertler (1995). I transform real GDP, GDP deflator and commodity
price index with log first-differences.
I replaced the effective Federal Funds Rates (FFR) from 2009Q1 to 2015Q3 with
the Wu and Xia (2016) shadow rate to account for the zero lower bound (ZLB) and
quantitative easing. To overcome this issue, Wu and Xia (2016) propose a non-linear
term structure model to construct a shadow interest rate that captures the effect of
unconventional monetary policies on the overall stance of monetary policy.15 During
these periods, the FFR was between 0 and 0.25 percent. Thus, the ‘Wu-Xia shadow
interest rate’ captures the overall monetary policy stance better than the FFR on its
own.
1.4.2 Measuring Disagreement
Following a line of literature that uses survey data to measure information frictions,
I calculate disagreement among forecasters from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadel-
phia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). In particular, the SPF’s cross-sectional
forecast dispersion that is defined as the difference between the 75th percentile and the
25th percentile of the projections in levels or growth at a point in time. Following this,
I define the benchmark disagreement measure among forecasters by calculating the in-
terquartile range of real GDP for the current quarter (nowcast), divided by the median
of the current quarter as a normalisation.16 Interquartile range is widely used in the
literature to ensure that any outliers do not unfairly influence the variable of interest
— the measure of disagreement.17
14I have seasonally adjusted commodity price index using the Census Bureau’s X-13 ARIMA-SEATS,
with near identical results.
15In response to the global financial crisis, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) took drastic
measures that took the FFR in to the effective lower bound from December 2008 to 2015, as they set the
target range for the FFR at 0 to 25 basis points. Additionally, the Fed took unconventional measures,
such as quantitative easing, to further ease credit conditions and lower long-term interest rates. Thus,
after December 2008, the FFR is less likely to describe the monetary policy stance well. The ‘Wu-
Xia shadow interest rate’ is updated only if the target range for the FFR is at or above 25 to 50. On
December 16, 2015, the FOMC raised the target range for the FFR to 25 to 50 basis points.
16As a robustness check, I also calculated the 2-quarter and 1-year ahead forecast disagreement of
the nominal GDP in Figure A.1 in Appendix A.3.1.
17This is similar to using standard deviation as a measure of disagreement. However, as Sill (2014)
shows, the standard deviation in cross-sectional forecasts is clearly more volatile, though tracks the
interquartile range measure fairly closely. In line with the literature, I measure disagreement using
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SPF is a quarterly survey of approximately 50 professional forecasters (on average)
across many different macroeconomic variables.18 It is one of the longest standing
macroeconomic surveys, starting in 1968Q4. Thus, it covers a variety of episodes in
U.S. macroeconomic history, including important economic events in the 1970s.
Furthermore, as professional forecasters are some of the most informed agents
in the economy, SPF serves as a conservative benchmark for information frictions in
their forecasts’ cross sectional variation. Such that, if there was an increase of informa-
tion frictions that reduces a professional forecaster’s ability to predict macroeconomic
aggregates — despite all publicly available information and forecasting techniques
— then, we could expect there would be higher information frictions among other
economic agents, such as households and firms.
I focus on the variable that is representative of the business cycle — real GDP
(nowcast) — as the aim of this paper is to study the responses of output and prices
to a monetary shock Rossi and Sekhposyan (2015).19 Additionally, as Bok et al. (2018)
highlight, forecasts are most helpful to understand where the economy is now. They
show there is little predictability of real GDP SPF forecasts beyond the current and
next quarter.
Figure 1.1 plots the disagreement measure — interquartile range of individual
responses divided by the median — for the current quarter (nowcasts) real GDP.20
The estimated value of the threshold parameter, as will be explained in the following
subsection, is the solid red line. High disagreement periods are defined as the periods
where the disagreement variable is above the threshold (as estimated by the model)
— depicted in the red shaded area. Grey shaded areas indicate the NBER business
cycle contraction dates. The delay parameter is set to 1, hence the regimes change
with a lag of one period, after crossing the threshold.
interquartile range.
18At its current format, each forecaster provide the same set of baseline variables for the current
quarter and up to four quarters ahead, as well as annualised values for the following 2 years for
certain variables. SPF also asks special variables and special questions with different horizons.
19To re-emphasise, this paper complements the literature looking at the effects of monetary policy
shock under time-varying disagreement, that has largely focused on inflation expectations disagreement,
such as Falck et al. (2019). See Section 1.2 for more details.
20The SPF provides individual forecasts for the quarterly and annual level of chain-weighted real
GDP. The dataset is seasonally adjusted. Prior to 1992, these are forecasts for real GNP. Note that there
was a consensus for the official measure of output to be GDP rather than GNP in 1991. The change
from GNP to GDP can also be observed in other macroeconomic forecast surveys such as Blue Chips.
In Figure A.7 in Appendix A.3.5, I show that real and nominal GNP tracks real and nominal GDP very












Real GDP Nowcast Disagreement
Figure 1.1. Time-Varying Real GDP Nowcast Disagreement
Note: Time series of the real GDP disagreement index based on the dispersion (interquartile range) of
SPF nowcast. The grey shaded areas indicate NBER-dated recessions. The red shaded areas indicate
high disagreement periods. The red line indicate the estimated threshold. The y-axis is the interquartile
range as a percentage of the median. It is simply a measure of dispersion, much like a standard
deviation.
Eyeballing Figure 1.1, we see that disagreement tends to be higher in the early
years of the survey (pre-early 1990) in comparison with the latter half of the sample.
As a check, a Wald structural break test point to 1980Q2 as the structural break in the
disagreement variable, rather than early 1990s.21 The shaded area in the chart shows
that 1980 is in the midst of the first portion of high disagreement period, thus the
results here is not solely due to a structural break in the sample period.22
This pattern of declining disagreement also tracks the period known as the Great
Moderation from 1984 to 2008, when the overall volatility of the economic data was
lower than in the pre-1984 period. However, it is important to emphasise that the
fall in disagreement is not just a consequence of the Great Moderation. We can still
observe high disagreement regimes, especially in the late 1980s to early 1990s, and
around business cycle recession dates. While high disagreement is (weakly) correlated
with recessions, high disagreement episodes are more prolonged after recessions, and
disagreement regime changes typically occur at a higher frequency than business
cycles.
21The output of the Supremum Wald (test for a structural break at an unknown break date, with
symmetric trimming of 15%) indicates to reject the null hypothesis of no structural break at the 5%
level, with a test statistic of 157.4213.
22Additionally, in Chapter 2, I show various robustness of using different structural changes (by
dates), and show that it produces different impulse response of various macroeconomic variables when
using disagreement of real GDP nowcasts.
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The rational inattention model in the previous section provides a plausible expla-
nation for the decline in disagreement in the latter half of the sample. Total attention
K may have increased as there is a generally greater effort in forecasting GDP and
other macroeconomic variables in the past 30 years. Moreover, during this time, fore-
casting methods and information available may have significantly improved, and thus
creates a lower disagreement among professional forecasters.
1.4.3 Methodology
Estimation of the Threshold Variable
The estimation of the threshold uses conditional maximum likelihood, following
Galvão (2006). If the threshold is known, it is possible to simply split the sample
(above and below the threshold variable) and estimate the parameters with OLS, as
well as the variance-covariance matrix Σ of the residuals Ut in each of the two regimes.












where |Σ̂(i)(θ)| is the determinant of the covariance matrix of the residuals Ut in
regimes i = 1, 2 (low and high disagreement regimes).
Threshold Vector Autoregression Model
The baseline methodology of this paper is a threshold VAR that allows the model to
capture potentially different effect of monetary policy shocks in high and low dis-
agreement regimes. The VAR model parameters are allowed to differ across (dis-
agreement) regimes, and the transition between the regimes being governed by the
evolution of a single endogenous variable of the VAR crossing a threshold (the ‘thresh-
old variable’).23 Therefore, this makes it possible that regime switches may occur after
the shock to each variable. Because of this, the magnitude (and even the sign) of the
impulse response may be affected by: (1) the state of the system at the time of the
shock, (2) the sign of the shock, and (3) the magnitude of the shock.
23There are other non-linear methodologies, including smooth-transition VARs, interacted VARs,
and Markov-switching approaches. The choice of appropriate non-linear methodology depends on the
specific research question.
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The threshold VAR model is described below. The first term in on the right hand
side of the equation is analogous to a linear VAR. The non-linearity of the model


















∗) + Ut (1.26)
where Yt is a vector of endogenous (stationary) variables as mentioned in the previous
section. I is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 when the threshold variable
is higher than the estimated threshold parameter θ∗, and 0 otherwise, with time lag d
set to 1. Ut are reduced-form disturbances. γ1(L) and γ2(L) are lag polynomial ma-
trices with order p. The lag order selection by Akaike information criteria marginally
chose 4 lags in the linear VAR, and to maintain consistency I estimate the threshold
VAR with the same number of lags.
The specific identification — real GDP, GDP deflator, commodity price index, FFR
and disagreement — reflects some assumptions about the links in the economy. The
ordering of the first four variables associated with the Cholesky decomposition of
the covariance matrix of Ut is widely used, such as in Bernanke and Gertler (1995).24
Ordering SPF dispersion last implies that it reacts contemporaneously to all other
variables. The results are robust to other orderings.
As this is a non-linear model, I use the generalised impulse response (GIRF) ap-
proach of Tsay (1998). The full algorithm, including the computation of bootstrap
confidence intervals, is described in Appendix C of Caggiano et al. (2015).
1.4.4 Baseline Results
The impulse responses in Figure 1.2 and 1.3 correspond to a 1 standard deviation
positive shock to FFR, while the shaded area corresponds to a 68% bootstrapped
confidence interval. Figure 1.2 shows the impulse response functions (IRFs) of lin-
ear vector autoregressive — i.e. without differentiating the level of disagreement in
economy. Figure 1.3 shows the generalised impulse responses (GIRFs) of the base-
line threshold VAR, allowing for a shock that occurs initially in a low disagreement
24The Cholesky decomposition I use in this paper assumes lower triangular matrix, such that mon-
etary policy shocks do not affect real GDP, GDP deflator and commodity price index within the same
quarter.
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regime (blue line) and high (red-dash line) disagreement regime. It is important to
note that the linear IRF in Figure 1.2 does not necessarily lie between the high and



























































Figure 1.2. VAR Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock
Note: The shock corresponds to a positive one standard deviation change in the FFR. The IRFs are
generated with 68% bootstrapped confidence intervals using (linear — without the distinction between
high and low disagreement) Cholesky-identified structural VAR. Sample period is 1970Q1-2018Q4.
In the linear VAR, the peak effect on real GDP is 0.5% after around 8 quarters
or 2 years, which is a typical horizon in the literature for output to respond to a
contractionary monetary shock. The commodity price index drops more quickly than
GDP deflator as expected by Bernanke and Gertler (1995). The sluggish responses in
real GDP and price level, as well as the persistent decline in GDP deflator is fairly
consistent with the literature, for example Galí (2015) and Christiano et al. (1999). The
GDP deflator depiction of a weak ‘price-puzzle’ — prices increase after an increase in
FFR — is a common finding for monetary shocks identified with a recursive VAR.
The generalised impulse responses (GIRFs) in Figure 1.3 show the main result
— that there is heterogeneity in the effects of monetary policy shocks in the two
disagreement regimes. In high disagreement periods (red lines), monetary policy
23
shocks have a strong impact on real activity yet a weak impact on nominal variable.































































Figure 1.3. Threshold VAR Generalised Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock
Note: The shock corresponds to a positive one standard deviation change in the FFR. The GIRFs are
generated with 68% bootstrapped confidence intervals using threshold VAR. The threshold is estimated
using SPF disagreement of the nowcasts of real GDP. Red dashed-line indicate high disagreement
period and blue solid-line low disagreement period. Sample period is between 1970Q1 and 2018Q4.
There is a long debate in the literature on the predictions of monetary policy
transmission in different economic regimes. When looking at recessions or higher
uncertainty, the typical intuition would be that agents becomes more cautious, and
therefore, respond more slowly. Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016) find strong evidence
that the effects of monetary policy on real and nominal variables are less powerful in
recessions. Castelnuovo and Pellegrino (2018) and Aastveit et al. (2017) also point to
a weak impact of monetary policy shocks on real activity under high uncertainty —
the period they relate with recessions.
In contrast, I show that in high disagreement periods, a positive shock to FFR is
more powerful in controlling output, yet less powerful in affecting prices.25 The peak
25Notice that these shocks are monetary policy shocks rather than monetary policy changes. The
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impact of the contractionary monetary policy shocks reduces GDP by approximately
0.3% in the low disagreement regime. Whereas, an equivalent sized shock reduces
GDP by 0.45% in high disagreement regime — a sizeable increase of around half.
Furthermore, the real effects of monetary policy is much more persistent under high
disagreement, in addition to falling faster on impact. Correspondingly, the impact of
monetary policy under low disagreement is stronger. At the end of the GIRFs horizon,
the impact on prices is -1.2%, almost twice lower than the effect of -0.7% under high
disagreement.
Therefore, the presence of heightened disagreement, the trade-off between output
and inflation worsens, as output falls faster after a positive monetary policy shock.
This means inflation-output trade-off is even trickier to deal with when disagreement
is high, which I discuss in more detail later in the discussion of policy implications.
The rational inattention model offers three explanations for the empirical findings.
All explanations have a common theme that to produce the more sluggish response
of prices to a monetary shock, attention paid by price-setters to aggregate conditions
must be lower. Thus, firms react less to monetary shocks, making prices more ‘sticky’.
A standard New Keynesian model with stickier prices would predict that output
would respond more to a monetary shock.
Firstly, the information processing capacity of firms could be lower, leading firms
to reduce attention to aggregate conditions (and others). This could be caused by
a variety of reasons — for example, the exit of firms over the business cycle break
down existing supplier-customer relationships that facilitate information flows across
the supply chain. This would also reduce the quality the information that the firm
processes, leading to higher disagreement, which is consistent with the empirical
finding.
Secondly, higher uncertainties in state variables other than aggregate conditions
(in the model, idiosyncratic productivity was one example), lead firms to re-allocate
attention away from aggregate conditions. This has the same effect in increasing
disagreement and stickier prices. This result also holds in larger general equilibrium
monetary policy shocks is relative to what the Taylor rule implies should happen, and the Taylor rule
is implicit in the (threshold) VAR in Eq (1.26). Thus, in times of weak growth, it is perfectly feasible to
have a positive monetary policy shock (that is, monetary policy could have loosened but not as much
as the implicit Taylor rule suggests). On another note, a negative shock (reduction in) FFR is not exactly
symmetric, but only for extremely large shocks. It does not change the main results of the paper.
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models. Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2009) show that by increasing the variance of
idiosyncratic productivity shocks, rationally inattentive firms pay very little attention
to monetary shocks, resulting in prices reacting slowly and by a small amount to a
monetary shock.
Thirdly, a decrease in aggregate demand uncertainty could potentially make prices
more sticky. A rationally inattentive firm would respond to this by reducing attention
allocated to monitoring aggregate conditions. As the model shows, in some parameter
regions, the endogenous response of attention allocation has the potential to increase
disagreement by reducing the information quality used to monitor on aggregate con-
ditions. These regions typically occur when the overall variance of aggregate condi-
tions is low compared to idiosyncratic shocks, thus the marginal benefits of paying
attention are high. This is exactly the parameter space that Maćkowiak and Wieder-
holt (2009) suggest is plausible to create the effect that prices respond sluggishly to
monetary shocks.
These theoretical results bridge the disagreement results with the broader litera-
ture on the effect of uncertainty on monetary transmission, which typically finds that
monetary policy has a weaker effect on prices and output during heightened uncer-
tainty. The effect of rising uncertainty on the responsiveness of prices is potentially
non-monotonic, and the three different posited mechanisms could be more important
at different times. As discussed earlier, Kozeniauskas et al. (2018) measure of ‘macro
uncertainty’ is positively but not strongly correlated with ‘higher-order uncertainty’
measured in dispersions in forecasts.26
Lastly, the response of the FFR is higher for longer in the low disagreement regime.
An explanation for this is, in high disagreement regime, output falls significantly by
more and thus the endogenous monetary policy component is forced to relax mon-
etary policy. On the other hand, as this does not occur under the low disagreement
regime, this enables the central bank to keep monetary policy tight for longer to lower
inflation. This suggests that, at least empirically, the inflation expectations channel
does not operate by as much as the fall in inflation created by the drag on output gap.
26The ‘cross-sectional disagreement’ among forecasters I use in this paper is closer to the ‘higher-
order uncertainty’ measure rather than ‘macro uncertainty’ measures such as Jurado et al. (2015) or
VIX used in many uncertainty papers.
26
1.5 Non-Linear Narrative Shocks
In this section, I consider alternative ways to empirically identify monetary policy
shocks, with a focus on the narrative identification. The ‘narrative’ approach refers
to the use of historical documents to reconstruct the intended policy target rate and
the information set of the policymakers (Cloyne and Hürtgen, 2016; Champagne and
Sekkel, 2018; Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco, 2020). I extend the narrative identifica-
tion by Romer and Romer (2004) as the narrative monetary shocks, and estimate it
non-linearly. I apply the non-linearly narratively identified monetary shocks to both
the threshold VAR framework, as well as local projections (which I will explore in
Section 1.6).
I consider the effects of the monetary policy shocks as the residuals from an es-
timated reaction function following Romer and Romer (2004) (henceforth, RR). RR
identify innovations to monetary policy by accounting for Federal Reserve’s informa-
tion set. I follow their orthogonalisation procedure by regressing the Federal Funds
target rate changes on Greenbook forecasts (and its revisions) at each FOMC meet-
ing.27 The original RR regression is:
∆FFRt = βbXt + εt (1.27)
where Xt are the control variables employed by RR, and the estimated residuals are the
identified monetary policy shocks.28 As the premise of this paper is that the behaviour
of the economy is characterised by forms of non-linearity and state-dependent, it
is possible that the FOMC’s monetary policy reaction function may has also been
state-dependent. In other words, estimating shocks with standard linear framework
may include state-dependent measurement error (Tenreyro and Thwaites, 2016). To
account for this possibility, I estimate the narrative shock analogue to the original RR,
corresponding to each definition of the economic state. For exposition here, I focus
using a dummy state variable F(zt) where F(zt) = 1 when in a high disagreement
27In the zero lower bound periods, I regress the changes in the Wu and Xia (2016) shadow rate
instead of the target rate. This is explained later in this section.
28The control variables are lags of Greenbook forecasts for GDP growth and GDP deflator, as well as
their revisions since the last FOMC meeting. As with Romer and Romer (2004), I match the Greenbook
used for the particular FOMC meeting.
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(H) state (defined as when zt is above its median), and F(zt) = 0 when in a low
disagreement (L) state.29




Xt + (1− F(zt−1))β(L)
′
Xt + ε̃t (1.28)
where Xt are the control variables employed by RR and the estimated residuals ε̃t are
the non-linearly identified monetary policy shocks.
The original RR series provides narrative monetary shocks up to 1996. I extend
the series up to 2013. The literature has extended the series up to the financial crisis,
such as Wieland and Yang (2020), Coibion et al. (2017), Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco
(2020), and Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016). I extend the series using the extended
dataset provided by Wieland and Yang (2020) up to 2007, and to 2008 using Coibion
et al. (2017). To complete the dataset to 2013, I hand-matched the Greenbook forecasts,
which are published with a five-year lag.
As noted in RR, the particular reason to analyse the Federal Reserve’s intentions
through the Federal Funds Rate (FFR) is, for much of the sample the Federal Reserve
targeted the FFR. Therefore, the change in the intended FFR captures best what the
Federal Reserve was aiming to do. This also deals with the concern of the periods
where FOMC was not explicitly targeting the FFR, as well as serving as the easiest
indicator of FOMC’s intentions to deduce accurately over a long period of time and
over a variety of monetary regimes. To maintain consistency, I also use this approach
after the financial crisis. However, where the FFR has been near the zero lower bound,
the target FFR would give zero variation in this period. In addition, the target FFR
does not capture the true monetary policy stance, due to the use of unconventional
monetary policies, such as quantitative easing (QE) and forward guidance. As in
the baseline exercise, I use the Wu and Xia (2016) shadow rate to capture the addi-
tional features of unconventional monetary policy that have noticeable impact on the
macroeconomy (Ramey, 2016).
29In Appendix A.3.4, I also define a smooth transition state using a logistic transformation as in
Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016). This is then used for the smooth transition local projections. For
consistency (across the baseline and the smooth transition local projection) in this section, I use F(zt)
to refer to the dummy state variable. Note that F(zt) = 1 is equal to It = 1 in Eq (1.26) and (2.2).
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Figure 1.4. Narrative Monetary Shocks. Top: Whole Sample, Bottom: Recent Sample.
Note: I extend the narrative monetary shocks of Romer and Romer (2004) up to 2013Q4. The top
figure shows the RR original shocks (black line), the extended linear narrative shock (blue line), and
the extended non-linear narrative shocks (orange line). The bottom figure zooms in to show how
the narrative approach with shadow rates neatly captures unexpected movements in unconventional
monetary policies since the global financial crisis.
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The standard in the literature for post-crisis monetary policy shock identifica-
tion uses high frequency data around monetary policy announcements (Cochrane
and Piazzesi, 2002; Gertler and Karadi, 2015; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018). The
high frequency identification literature often refers to the changes in futures contracts
around key monetary events. They use a tight window around these events, in or-
der to isolate monetary policy news from other types of shocks (Cesa-Bianchi et al.,
2020). However, data for high frequency identification only goes back to the 1990s,
as these financial instruments were not actively traded before then, it at all. While
this is sufficient for monthly estimation, this paper uses the Survey of Professional
Forecasters which is performed quarterly. Using the narrative monetary policy shock
identification (instead of high frequency) allows me to use the full sample from the
1970s.
Figure 1.4 shows how the narrative approach with shadow rates neatly captures
unexpected movements in unconventional policies since the financial crisis.30 We ob-
serve a large positive shock in the first quarter of 2009. In March, the FOMC observed
an increasing economic slack and this was reflected in a significant downgrade of
economic forecasts — real GDP growth at two quarters ahead was downgraded to
-0.5% instead of +1.8% — indicating that the FOMC realised that the U.S. economy
was in a deep recession. This led their decision of announcing additionally large QE.
However, the QE was not strong enough to overcome the contractionary effect of the
Delphic forward guidance (Campbell et al., 2012). By 2009Q2, the FOMC saw a mod-
est improvement in the economic outlook since the March meeting, reflected in their
forecasts upgrades, which partly reflected some easing of financial market conditions.
However, economic activity was likely to remain weak for a time, thus the magnitude
was smaller than the preceding quarter. By the end of the 2009, in light of ongoing
improvements in the financial markets, the FOMC signalled that the special liquidity
facilities will expire in 2010Q1. Nonetheless, they communicated that they were pre-
pared to modify plans if necessary to support financial stability and economic growth,
which helps explain the small positive (contractionary) shock.
Another example of how the narrative approach captures monetary policy shocks
is shown in the first half of 2012, where there is a sequence of positive shocks. In these
30My notation focuses on the events after the financial crisis. Economic events in periods between
1997 and 2007 have been discussed in the aforementioned papers.
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periods, the FOMC did not start QE3, as the market had hoped multiple times. There
was a relatively dovish statement, but was largely expected by markets. Combined,
this is reflected in the modest contractionary shocks in the periods.
Moreover, in June 2013, there were discussions of ‘tapering’ QE purchases, con-
tingent on a continuation of good economic data.31 These discussions surprised fi-
nancial markets, and in effect, producing what would be widely known as the “taper
tantrum”. However, in September 2013, the FOMC held off from scaling back as-
set purchases — again, surprising market participants, but in the opposite direction.
Correspondingly, these two unexpected announcements generated a positive shock
(contractionary) in June 2013, and a negative shock (expansionary) in September 2013
in the generated RR shocks in Figure 1.4.
1.5.1 Threshold VAR using Narrative Monetary Shocks
The next step in the analysis is to use the new non-linear narrative monetary shocks
to estimate the effects on real and nominal variables. In order to be consistent with
the baseline specification in Section 1.4.4 and standard literature, I follow Romer
and Romer (2004) in using the narrative shocks instead of the FFR, but keeping the
Cholesky ordering of the variables the same.32
Figure 1.5 shows the responses of output and prices to a positive one standard de-
viation shock to the narrative monetary shock. Quantitatively, it is difficult to compare
the narratively identified monetary shock to the Cholesky identified. One standard
deviation shock in the narrative identified monetary shock (which is in changes-space)
is not equal to the one standard deviation shock to FFR in levels. Additionally, because
the GIRFs are inherently non-linear, we cannot simply scale the responses. Hence, I
focus on the qualitative differences between the high and low disagreement responses
of output and prices.
Qualitatively, using a different shock identification (narrative shocks), the main
results still hold. The results here also demonstrates the heterogeneity in the effect
31Specifically, the FOMC plan to reduce the pace of purchases of Treasuries from $85 billion per
month to $65 billion by the second half of 2013, and further possibility of completely stopping asset
purchases in 2014.
32I also removed commodity prices as a control because as Romer and Romer (2004) discussed, the
narrative identification sufficiently avoids endogenous and anticipatory movements unlike the FFR,
and therefore does not produce a large price-puzzle.
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of monetary policy shock across the high and low disagreement regimes. In high
disagreement periods, prices respond weakly to monetary policy shock, but output
responds strongly. In low disagreement, the opposite is true. Thus, the main result
and mechanism as previously explained – that prices are more sticky in high dis-
agreement periods due to higher information frictions, leading to larger real effects of















































Figure 1.5. Threshold VAR Generalised Impulse Responses to a Narrative Monetary Shock
Note: The shock corresponds to a positive one standard deviation change in the narrative monetary
shocks. The GIRFs are generated with 68% bootstrapped confidence intervals using threshold VAR.
The threshold is estimated using SPF disagreement of the nowcasts of real GDP. Red-dash (blue-solid)
lines indicate high (low) disagreement period. Sample period is 1970Q1-2013Q4.
In a more quantitative detail, we see in Figure 1.5 that at peak impact (around
six-quarter horizon), the contractionary monetary policy reduces real GDP by ap-
proximately 0.2%, and similarly until the end of the horizon. During low disagree-
ment periods, output eventually reduces by 0.07%, which is three times weaker com-
pared to the response during high disagreement periods. Overall, the responses in
the two regimes are significantly different from zero, and from each other. During
high disagreement periods, output become immediately statistically significant from
32
zero, while there is a lag during low disagreement periods. This is also observed in
the generalised impulse response of output in Figure 1.3. In high disagreement, the
peak response of output to the narrative monetary shocks is about half of the peak
effect to the Cholesky identified monetary shocks.
The difference in magnitude is even more apparent in the response of prices to
the two shocks. In low disagreement, the response of GDP deflator to the narrative
monetary shock is -0.15%. More importantly, here we also observe the difference
between the responses in high and low disagreement periods using the two shocks
identification. Prices respond more strongly in low disagreement periods, and that
it is significantly different from the response during high disagreement in the lat-
ter horizon. This suggests that both shocks identification strategies are able to pick
up the heterogeneity in the responses of macroeconomic variables during different
disagreement periods.
1.6 Local Projections
In this section, I explore the robustness of the main results by applying the non-
linearly narratively identified monetary shocks to the local projections method.33 The
innovation of narratively identified monetary shocks has allowed for the possibility
of using direct projections method to study the effects of monetary policy shocks on
macroeconomic variable. Local projections method has more recently been applied
to study the state-dependent effects of monetary policy as it can be easily adapted
for estimating a state-dependent model (Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016); Coibion et al.
(2017); Aastveit et al. (2017); Falck et al. (2019)).
I use Jordà’s (2005) local projections method to estimate the impulse response to
estimate the response of output and inflation for each horizon h. The linear model is
as follows:
xt+h = αh + ψh(L)Xt−1 + βhshockt + εt+h for h = 0, 1, 2, ..., (1.29)
33In understanding propagation of structural shocks, an often asked question is how to choose
between SVAR and LP estimators of impulse responses. A conventional wisdom is that SVARs are more
efficient (Ramey, 2016), while LPs are more robust to model misspecification (Jordà, 2005). However,
many of these remarks are not based on formal analysis. Plagborg-Møller and Wolf (2020) prove
that LPs and VARs estimate the same impulse responses, as well as showing that the two are not
conceptually different methods.
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Similarly, for the model that allows state-dependence, I estimate a set of regres-
sions for each horizon h as follows:
xt+h = F(zt−1)[αA,h + ψA,h(L)Xt−1 + βA,hshockt]
+ (1− F(zt−1))[αB,h + ψB,h(L)Xt−1 + βB,hshockt] + εt+h
where x is the variable of interest, X is a vector of control variables, ψh(L) is a poly-
nomial in the lag operator, F(zt−1) denotes the state, and shockt is the narratively-
identified shock. The control variables include a linear and a quadratic trend, and lag
of x. I set the lag to 4 quarters to maintain consistency. The coefficient βh gives the
response of x at time t + h to the shock at time t. The impulse responses are con-
structed as sequences of the βh’s estimated in a series of single regressions for each
horizon. The state variable F(zt−1) equals 1 when the economy is in regime A (high
disagreement periods) and 0 when in regime B (low disagreement periods).34 The
interactions with the indicator variable allows all coefficients to vary according to the
state of the economy. The set of coefficients βA,h and βB,h are used to construct the im-
pulse responses for each regime A and B, respectively. Furthermore, as is standard in
the literature, I use the Newey-West standard error correction to address the potential
autocorrelation in the residuals (Newey and West, 1994).
1.6.1 Local Projection Impulse Responses
Figure 1.6 shows the state-dependent local projections impulse responses to a 1%
narrative monetary shock. Much like comparing the narratively identified threshold
VAR, it is tricky to compare these local projections to the Cholesky identified (base-
line) threshold VAR. In this subsection, I compare these local projections impulse
responses to the narrative threshold VAR. This allows for a focus on the different
methodologies, rather than shock identification. However, this is also tricky because
while Figure 1.6 are state-dependent impulse responses, they are linear within a state
(unlike GIRFs in the threshold VAR, which allow switching between the states).
Thus, due to this intricacy, the focus of the analysis remains on the qualitative
comparison between the responses in high and low disagreement regime, given the
34In the appendix, I also define a smooth transition state using a logistic transformation as in Ten-
reyro and Thwaites (2016).
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methodologies. The main results and mechanism apparent in both threshold VARs
are also present in the local projections, illustrating the robustness of the result to
estimation procedures. In high disagreement periods, output responds fairly quickly
to the monetary shocks. Whereas in the low disagreement regime, output is statisti-
cally insignificant from zero for more than twelve quarters. This result arises from the
higher stickiness of prices during the high disagreement periods, as apparent from
the magnitude of the impulse responses towards the end of the profile. As for prices,
in low disagreement periods, the impact of monetary policy shocks is twice stronger
than in high disagreement periods. The responses in the high and low disagreement
regimes are significantly different in the latter part of the horizon — in line with the








































Figure 1.6. Local Projection Impulse Responses to a Narrative Monetary Shock
Note: The first and second column shows the response of real output and prices to a 1% narrative
monetary shock. The first and second rows show the responses under high (red-dash lines) and low
(blue-solid lines) disagreement periods, respectively. The shaded area is the 68% confidence interval.
The sample period is from 1970Q1 to 2013Q4.
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In order to be able to quantitatively compare it with Figure 1.5, notice that the size
of the shocks is not exactly the same. In the threshold VAR, the shock corresponds to
a positive one standard deviation change in the narrative monetary shocks — equiva-
lent to approximately 0.45% shock to narrative monetary shocks. With this consider-
ation, in high disagreement regime, the peak response of output is twice larger when
using the threshold VAR. Meanwhile, the response of prices is much stronger (about
4 times) with local projections. In low disagreement, IRFs in Figure 1.6 also show a
larger reduction, although only by twenty percent by the end of the horizon. Thus,
in response to a narrative monetary shock, state-dependent local projections seems
to capture stronger effect in prices (than in comparison to the results using threshold
VAR).
1.7 Conclusion and Policy Implications
The main contribution of the paper is to empirically document the state-dependent
effects of monetary policy with regard to real output nowcast disagreement using
threshold VARs and non-linear local projections. In periods of heightened disagree-
ment, monetary policy has smaller effects on inflation, but larger on output. This
is robust to both Cholesky and narratively identified monetary shocks. This result
complements Falck et al. (2019) where they find monetary policy is weaker on infla-
tion during high inflation expectations disagreement, but no heterogeneous effects on
output. Additionally, my findings contrast to the literature on the effects of uncer-
tainty on monetary transmission (where they find weaker response of both output
and inflation during higher uncertainty periods). A by-product of the model dis-
sects the relationship between uncertainty and disagreement, and how they distinctly
affect state-dependent monetary transmission under varying degree of information
frictions.
The intuition of the main result is that price-setters respond less in periods with
higher information frictions, and thus prices become stickier. These stickier prices
lead to smaller price adjustments, but also because of the higher nominal rigidities, it
causes a flatter Philips curve, leading to larger output effects for the given monetary
shock. Another insight from the rational inattention model is that endogenous op-
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timal attention allocation could cause disagreement to change non-monotonically in
response to fluctuations in aggregate uncertainty.
The key policy takeaway from these results is the role of central bank communica-
tion. The results show that during periods of low disagreement, contractionary mone-
tary policy (that intends to reduce inflation, “disinflationary policy”) is able to reduce
inflation significantly with relatively little output loss. This raises the potentially
important role of central bank in communicating aggregate conditions to economic
agents, enabling them to internalise the disinflationary (contractionary) policy that
effectively makes prices more flexible. Thus, the sacrifice ratio is lower and enables
an inflation-targeting central bank to better achieve its objective. This mechanism
complements the literature results in having a credible central bank moving inflation
expectations down during a disinflationary policy episode, which further reduces the
sacrifice ratio.
Similarly, if inflation is below target but output is at potential, it is also optimal
for the central bank to communicate. The increased in price flexibility allows it to
increase inflation to target more quickly, while avoiding large and unsustainable posi-
tive output gaps (which are associated with undesirable effects, such as misallocation
and credit booms). However, if a dual-mandate central bank objective is to raise eco-
nomic growth rather than to stabilise inflation, it is not necessarily optimal either to
not communicate. In a world of low interest rates, forward guidance could be a potent
tool for expansionary monetary policy. Naturally, communication is an integral part
of forward guidance. Thus, improving communication during such an episode, and
achieving the benefits of forward guidance may outweigh the cost of increased price
flexibility in terms of a reduction of the real effects of monetary policy.
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Chapter 2
Reconciling the Effects of Government
Spending: The Role of Information
Frictions
2.1 Introduction
Since the 2008 financial crisis and the large fiscal stimulus surrounding it, there has
been a reinvigoration in understanding the variations of how government spending
influence the business cycle. Standard neoclassical models have long emphasised
the importance of forward-looking expectations in the effectiveness of fiscal policy.
With Ricardian equivalence, households consumption falls in response to a positive
government spending shock as households save in anticipation of a future tax rise.
Yet, a broad empirical literature finds a positive response of consumption, which
is more in line with the predictions of Keynesian models. This paper empirically
reconciles the Keynesian and neoclassical predictions on the effects of fiscal policy,
through emphasising the importance of information frictions.
I estimate the state-dependent responses in high and low information friction
regimes with non-linear local projections. I use a popular identification strategy of
government spending shocks following Blanchard and Perotti (2002) (henceforth, BP).
I find that the effect of a positive government spending shock increases output in
both high and low information friction regimes, but only increases consumption in
the high information friction regime. This leads to the magnitude of the stimulatory
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effect on output to be higher during periods of high information frictions, despite the
paths of government spending under both regimes being remarkably similar. Thus, in
high information frictions periods, consumption behaves similarly to the Keynesian
prediction. In contrast, in the other regime, the consumption fall is more akin to the
neoclassical prediction.
How do information frictions reconcile these results? Information frictions affect
how forward-looking households and firms can be. In particular, the Ricardianness of
the households (anticipating current or future tax rises in response to a government
spending increase) could be influenced by information frictions. In turn, the ability
of households to form accurate expectations on future income and economic condi-
tions varies along with to these frictions. Consequently, households’ response to a
government spending shock could vary over time.
Specifically, if households find it more difficult to predict the future path of taxes
(in response to a government spending shock, which may not be easily observable
in real-time), it is plausible that households behave in a non-Ricardian way as they
do not anticipate higher future taxes. This leads to more Keynesian effects of gov-
ernment spending. Conversely, a low information frictions regime enable households
to be highly forward-looking, and thus, close to fully Ricardian. In turn, they ob-
serve the shock and save ahead in anticipation of higher future taxes to smooth their
consumption, resulting in the usual neoclassical prediction.
Following an extensive literature, I measure information frictions through dis-
agreement of professional forecasters: in particular, nowcasts of real output. When
information frictions are highly prevalent, forecasts of the aggregate economy are
more difficult to form — even by those best placed to make forecasts, such as those in
the Survey of Professional Forecasters — and thus, they are more likely to be dispersed.
On the other hand, take the extreme case of zero information frictions where all fore-
casters would use all available information perfectly, and they would all make the
same forecast (zero disagreement).
The key contribution of this paper is the reconciliation of the (theoretical and em-
pirical) debate on the behaviour of consumption after a government spending shock.
While both sides agree output rises following an unanticipated expansion in govern-
ment spending, Ramey and Shapiro (1998) find that consumption falls, yet BP find
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that consumption rises. Reis (2018) attribute their differences owing to their identi-
fication strategies. BP uses structural assumptions on the formation of fiscal policy
to identify exogenous spending shocks, while Ramey and Shapiro (1998) uses war
build-ups as the source of the shocks. Here, I find that even with the BP identification
strategy, consumption can fall after a government spending shock, if households are
given the chance to be sufficiently Ricardian (during low information frictions). If not,
more Keynesian effects take hold, and thus consumption rises after the expansion in
government spending.
These results guide further research into different microfoundations for fiscal pol-
icy dynamic models. For instance, Galí et al. (2007) emphasise the need for not only
nominal rigidities, but also a large group of non-Ricardian households to achieve a
positive co-movement of consumption and government spending. The latter is mod-
elled as hand-to-mouth households that consume their entire disposable income. In
this paper, the main result suggests information frictions should be a part of the trans-
mission channel.
A second contribution of this paper is on the state-dependent transmission chan-
nel of the different components of government spending (government consumption
and government investment), as well as transfer payments. The key takeaway for
fiscal policymakers is that information frictions affect the ability of economic agents,
such as firms and households, to respond to various fiscal shocks. This highlights
that economic agents pay heterogeneous attention to the different types of govern-
ment spending, and may respond differently to the specific type of shock.
Specifically, information frictions affect the behaviour of households (private con-
sumption) the most in response to shocks in government consumption and transfer
payments. The state-dependency of private consumption in response to these two
shocks is particularly distinct. The short-term effect of transfer payment is stronger
and statistically significant across low and high disagreement periods. Whereas, the
medium-run private consumption impact of a government spending shock is twice
that of the effect on transfer payments when information frictions are high.
These findings are consistent with disparate transmission channels of the two
shocks. Transfer payments — such as social security and unemployment benefits —
work more directly through increasing the current income of households with high
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marginal propensity to consume. This is consistent with the main results where rule-
of-thumb households choose to consume more in the current period than to save for
future tax rise. On the other hand, government consumption works through indirect,
general equilibrium channels. The purchase of domestically produced goods and
services by the government leads to the standard Keynesian amplification channels
through increased aggregate demand and hiring.
Moreover, the responses of private investment to a government spending shock
show fewer heterogeneities between the high and low information frictions regimes.
Broadly, the results are similar to the empirical literature where private investment
falls during both regimes after an expansionary government spending shock, due
to crowding out effects.1 However, this is not observed in the responses of private
investment to government investment and transfer payment shocks. Government in-
vestment crowds-in private investment but only in low disagreement regime, whereas
transfer payments more strongly crowds-out private investment in the same regime.
This is consistent with the channel of complementarities between public and private
productive investment — where productive government investment crowds-in private
investment, and ‘non-productive’ transfers crowds-out private investment.
The fiscal policy literature is vast and has little agreement. As previously high-
lighted, even though most macroeconomic models predict that an expansionary effect
on output, those models often differ on the implied effects on consumption. Galí et al.
(2007) discuss how the textbook IS-LM (Keynesian) and the standard RBC (neoclas-
sical) models provide an example of such stark heterogeneous qualitative predictions
on private consumption. The Keynesian model predicts that consumption should rise
as consumers behave in a non-Ricardian way, with their consumption being a function
of their current disposable income and not of their lifetime resources. On the other
hand, the neoclassical model of macroeconomic fluctuations is based on economic
agents who optimise intertemporally with an increase in the present value of lump-
sum taxes. This negative wealth effect induced by the fiscal expansion through an
unproductive government spending results in the lowering of private consumption.
The New Keynesian model that incorporates nominal rigidities into the neoclassi-
cal framework exhibits the same wealth effect that crowds out consumption after an
1An exception to this is the first few quarters after the shock, where under low disagreement,
investment rises initially falling.
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expansionary fiscal shock. In the more recent theoretical models, replicating the em-
pirically relevant ‘crowding-in’ comovement within a DSGE framework is possible by
adding extra elements, although it remains challenging (Jacob, 2015).2
Similarly, the empirical evidence on private consumption to a shock in govern-
ment spending can support either theoretical view above.3 Several authors have found
that government spending shocks cause private consumption to rise (a non-exhaustive
list includes Fatás and Mihov (2001); Blanchard and Perotti (2002); Galí et al. (2007);
Perotti et al. (2007)), although these findings are challenged by Ramey and Shapiro
(1998); Edelberg et al. (1999); Burnside et al. (2004); Ramey (2008). Often, the dif-
ferent findings depend on the methodologies and identification strategies. The most
common identification methods are narrative techniques (Ramey and Shapiro, 1998;
Ramey and Zubairy, 2018) and various structural vector autoregressive approaches
with Cholesky decomposition following Blanchard and Perotti (2002).4 More recently
the local projections approach (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2013; Ramey, 2016) that
I use here have gained popularity, where the shock identification can use either the
narrative (news shocks) or BP shocks.
The ‘non-linearity’ in this paper is in line with many papers in the empirical fiscal
policy literature that looks at the state-dependent effects of fiscal policy shocks, such
as Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) and Ramey and Zubairy (2018).5 Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko (2013) find that multipliers are large in recessions, arguing that
when there is more slack, crowding out effects are less likely, and the Keynesian
effects become more likely. On the other hand, Ramey and Zubairy (2018) find that
multipliers are below unity, regardless of slack (with an exception to the zero lower
bound period, where spending multipliers are around 1.5).6 In relation to this paper,
if high disagreement periods purely contain recessions, the results here could merely
2See Chapter 3 for a more thorough literature review on the theoretical models on positive private
consumption multiplier.
3There is an equivalently large literature on tax shocks that I do not discuss here. Ramey (2016)
has a detailed discussion on identification methods. While papers such as Mertens and Ravn (2013)
and Leeper et al. (2013) discuss fiscal foresight, in particular, the difficulties of identifying anticipated
shocks to tax.
4There are various application of the VAR such as sign restriction VAR (Mountford and Uhlig,
2009), Bayesian VAR (d’Alessandro et al., 2019) and Panel VAR (Ravn et al., 2007).
5There are, of course, other types of nonlinearities such as asymmetries like those explored in
Brinca et al. (2019).
6Using military spending to identify government spending shock, Biolsi (2017) find higher slack
threshold produce higher multiplier, but still below unity.
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show the standard slack channels (rather than the effect of information frictions).7
The correlation between the disagreement state variable in this paper and indicators
of recession (or slack) is only mildly positive. The correlation with the slack state of
Ramey and Zubairy (2018) is 0.2, and with NBER-dated recessions is below 0.4. In
other words, the disagreement variable I describe in this paper captures variation in
both, recessions (or slack) and expansions.
Furthermore, the results here are robust to numerous robustness checks. The
placebo tests with different time, such as Great Inflation and Great Moderation peri-
ods, confirms that the distinct responses of macroeconomic variables to the disaggre-
gated government spending shocks is indeed due to the varying degree of information
frictions, not a specific time period. I also find the results to be robust to alternative
measurements of disagreement.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, I describe the macroe-
conomic data. I present the measurement of state using the cross-sectional disagree-
ment among forecasters in Section 2.2.2. I explain the econometric methodology and
shock identification in Section 2.3. I present the linear and state-dependent impulse
responses, as well as multipliers to a government spending shock in Section 2.4, and
to the disaggregated shocks in Section 2.5. The robustness checks using placebo test
can be found in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Data Description
I obtained quarterly data of the macroeconomic variables from Federal Reserve Eco-
nomic Data (FRED). All variables are seasonally adjusted. The sample period is be-
tween 1970Q1 and 2018Q4. It starts on 1970Q1 because the measure for disagreement
— discussed in the next section — is derived from the Survey of Professional Fore-
casters (now run by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia) which starts in 1970.
This sample period includes a wide variety of economic dynamics: ranging from the
unstable Great Inflation, the Great Moderation, but in particular, the Great Recession.
This was a time where government spending played an important role, with a sig-
nificant fiscal stimulus package (American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009)
7Although, note that it does not preclude information frictions as another mechanism of why
multipliers are large in recessions.
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being implemented. Indeed, the concerted fiscal policy reaction to counteract the
Great Recession, sparked a renaissance in fiscal policy research.
2.2.1 Log vs Level
I transform real GDP, real consumption, real investment, real wage and real govern-
ment spending using the Gordon and Krenn’s (2010) transformation (dividing the
variables by an estimate of the potential GDP), and then taking the logarithms. In this
way, one can interpret the IRFs as responses to a 1% changes in government spending.
When estimating the multiplier, I also divide all NIPA variables by an estimate of
the potential GDP but do not take logarithms of the variables. As discussed in Ramey
and Zubairy (2018), this puts all NIPA variables in the same units, such that one can
estimate the multiplier directly. For example, an output multiplier of 1.5 means an
increase of 1 U.S. dollar of government spending increases output by 1.5 U.S. dollars.8
This remark on the data transformation would be particularly crucial in Section 2.5
where I compare the responses of macroeconomic variables to disaggregated govern-
ment spending shocks.
2.2.2 Measurement of State
As in the previous chapter, I use survey data to measure the time-varying informa-
tion frictions. I also measure the state of the economy using disagreement of real
GDP nowcasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. I choose (the dispersions
of) professional forecasters to construct the disagreement variable in this chapter for
three reasons. Firstly, the data availability of professional forecasts is excellent. The
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) is
a quarterly survey of approximately 50 professional forecasters (on average) across
many macroeconomic variables.9 Secondly, this particular survey goes back to the
1970s, covering a variety of episodes in U.S. macroeconomic history, as previously
mentioned. Thirdly, professional forecasters are some of the most informed agents
8Ramey and Zubairy (2018) note the use of Gordon and Krenn’s (2010) transformation in their
paper is for both the calculation of multiplier and analysing the IRFs. However, the IRFs plot the
responses of output and government spending to a 1% increase of government spending.
9At its current format, each forecaster provides the same set of variables for the current quarter to
four quarters ahead, as well as annualised values for the following 2 years for certain variables.
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in the economy. They therefore provide a conservative benchmark for information
frictions in their forecasts’ cross sectional variation. This is because if there was any
informational friction increase that reduces their ability to forecast macroeconomic
aggregates — despite all the information and knowledge the professional forecasters
have access to — it would be highly likely that the rise in information frictions af-
fect economic agents who make real economy decisions, such as consumption and
investment.
I also use economic output (real GDP) forecasts as the main variable because it is
a relevant variable of interest to different economic agents. For example, current real
GDP informs households of their current real income and potentially employment
prospect, and thus helps inform their current consumption plan. Likewise, current
real GDP partly determines a firm’s future demand schedule. This is a crucial ele-
ment in their investment decisions, as firms often need time to invest into building











Real GDP Nowcast Dispersion
Figure 2.1. Real GDP Nowcast Disagreement
Note: Time series of real GDP disagreement index based on the dispersion (interquartile range) of
Survey of Professional Forecasters nowcast. The red shaded areas indicate high disagreement periods.
The red line indicate the sharp transition threshold given by the median disagreement. The grey
shaded areas indicate NBER-dated recessions.
Figure 2.1 plots the Survey of Professional Forecaster cross-sectional disagree-
ment, interquartile range of individual responses (dispersion) divided by the median,
for the current quarter (nowcast) of real GDP.10 Higher cross-sectional disagreement
10Figure 2.1 and Figure 1.1 are similar but with one difference. In Figure 2.1, the SPF’s real GDP
nowcast disagreement regimes are split by the median, whereas in Figure 1.1, it is split using a threshold
value estimated using a constrained conditional maximum likelihood.
45
among forecasters represents an economy under high information frictions. High in-
formation friction periods are defined as the periods where the disagreement is above
the threshold — depicted in the red shaded area. And vice versa, lower cross sectional
disagreement among forecasters represents an economy under low information fric-
tions, below the (red line) threshold. Grey shaded areas indicate the NBER business
cycle contraction dates. The threshold parameter is chosen such that each regime
contains half of the disagreement data (median disagreement), ensuring consistency
across different disagreement measures in the robustness in Appendix B.2.1.
The chart shows that disagreement generally tend to be higher in the survey early
years compared with the latter half of the sample. Broadly speaking, this pattern of
declining disagreement tracks the period known as the Great Moderation from 1984 to
2008, when the overall volatility of the economic data was lower than in the pre-1984
period. Although we could still observe high disagreement regimes during the Great
Moderation, especially around business cycle contraction dates. While high disagree-
ment is correlated with recessions, high disagreement episodes are more prolonged
than recessions, and disagreement regime changes typically occur at a higher fre-
quency than business cycles. The correlation between the disagreement state variable
in this paper and indicators of recession (or slack) is only mildly positive. The corre-
lation with the slack state of Ramey and Zubairy (2018) is 0.2, and with NBER-dated
recessions is below 0.4.
2.3 Econometric Methodology
2.3.1 Local Projections
I use Jordà’s (2005) local projections to estimate the impulse responses. This method
estimates a series of regression for each horizon h for each variable. The linear model
is as follows
xt+h = αh + ψh(L)zt−1 + βhshock
G
t + εt+h for h = 0, 1, 2, ..., H (2.1)
where x is the variable of interest, z is a vector of control variables, ψh(L) is a poly-
nomial in the lag operator, and shock is the identified shock. The vector of baseline
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control variables, z, contains lags of government spending and variable of interest (for
example, consumption). The term ψh(L) is a lag polynomial of order 4, as I use quar-
terly data. The identification of the shock is discussed in the next subsection. shockGt
in Eq (2.1) is the shocks identified in Eq (2.3). εt+h is the residual term.
The coefficient βh gives the response of x at time t + h to the shock at time t. The
impulse responses are constructed as sequences of the βh’s estimated in a series of
single regressions for each horizon. This method stands in contrast to the standard
method of estimating the parameters of the VAR for horizon 0 and then using them
to iterate forward to construct the impulse response functions.
The local projections method is easily adapted to estimating a state-dependent
model. While Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) were the first to employ this
method to estimate state-dependent fiscal policy, the model used in this paper is
closer to Ramey and Zubairy (2018). Similar to the linear model, for the model that
allows state-dependence, I estimate a set of regressions for each horizon h as follows
xt+h = It−1[αA,h + ψA,h(L)zt−1 + βA,hshock
G
t ]
+ (1− It−1)[αB,h + ψB,h(L)zt−1 + βB,hshockGt ] + εt+h
(2.2)
The indicator variable I equals 1 when the economy is in regime A (high information
frictions) and 0 when is in regime B (low information frictions). The interactions
with the indicator variable allows all coefficients to vary according to the state of
the economy. The set of coefficients βA,h and βB,h are used to construct the impulse
responses for each regime A and B, respectively. shockGt in Eq (2.2) is the shocks
that will be identified in Eq (2.4) which allows for the non-linearity (high and low
information frictions). As is standard in the literature, I use the Newey-West standard
errors to allow for potential autocorrelation in the residuals (Newey and West, 1994).11
2.3.2 Shock Identification
In the fiscal policy literature, there are two common ways to identify government
spending shock: Blanchard-Perotti (Cholesky) and military spending news. In this pa-
11Newey-West standard errors require a choice to be made on the bandwidth of the maximum
periods of autocorrelation of the regressions’ residuals εt+h. While Jordà (2005) uses the bandwidth
H + 1, I follow Ramey and Zubairy (2018) instead which uses the automatic bandwidth selection in
Newey and West (1994).
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per, the government spending shock corresponds to the Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
(BP) identification. BP identification rely on the institutional information about the tax
and transfer systems, to exploit the lag of government spending and tax collections
to identify the shocks to fiscal policy. The decision and implementation lags imply
that at a sufficiently high frequency (in this case within a quarter), there is little or no
discretionary response of fiscal policy to unexpected contemporaneous movements in
economic activity. Using these shocks, it is possible to trace the dynamic effects of
fiscal policy shocks on GDP and its components.
The BP approach orthogonalises current government spending by lags of real
government spending, real net tax and real GDP.12 For the non-linear case, I allow
the coefficients to vary in both regimes. I modify the methodology from Ramey and
Zubairy (2018) slightly to accommodate the IRFs estimation more than output. To
identify the BP shock consistently for all of the variables, I identify the shock prior to
the IRFs estimation.13 In the linear case, this is done by orthogonalising government
spending with lags of itself, as well as output and taxes as follows14
Gt = βG(L)Gt−1 + βT(L)Tt−1 + βY(L)Yt−1 + shockGt (2.3)
Similarly for the model that allows state-dependence, where I equals 1 when the
economy is in the high disagreement regime and 0 in low disagreement regime. The
interactions with the indicator variable allows the shock to vary according to the state
of the economy.
Gt = It−1[βG(L)Gt−1 + βT(L)Tt−1 + βY(L)Yt−1]
+ (1− It−1)[βG(L)Gt−1 + βT(L)Tt−1 + βY(L)Yt−1] + shockGt
(2.4)
12In the Cholesky identification, government spending is ordered first because of the aforemen-
tioned lags of the setting of discretionary fiscal policy. Additionally, I follow Ramey and Zubairy
(2018) to use lags of average tax rate (tax revenue as a ratio of GDP), instead of real net tax.
13Because Ramey and Zubairy (2018) only studies output effects, they can use government spending
directly in the local projections regression. By the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem, this is identical to
orthogonalising the shock first (Frisch and Waugh, 1933; Lovell, 1963).













The shock identified from this procedure is then taken to the IRFs estimation. For the
non-linear estimation, the orthogonalisation regression is allowed to take different
coefficients in the two regimes. This is very similar to Blanchard and Perotti (2002),
and the narrative identification in the monetary policy literature (Romer and Romer,
2004) (in the non-linear setting, see Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016)).
An often used narrative identification strategy for fiscal policy shocks is to use
news to military spending. Ramey and Zubairy (2018) use this to complement BP
identification. However, as Ramey (2011) noted, there is little variation in this series
after the Korean War. While this is perfectly fine for Ramey and Zubairy (2018) whose
sample starts in the late 19th century, the disagreement series starts in 1970 (discussed
in Section 2.2.2) — therefore, the narrative identification of military news would be
unsuitable for this paper. As a cross-check, instrumenting the BP identified shock
with the military news variable, results in a first-stage F-statistic between 2-3 for the
BP orthogonalised government spending, or at 3-4 for the non-orthogonalised (raw)
government spending (Table 2.1). This is far below the usual rule-of-thumb of F-
statistic of 10 for a strong instrument.
Output Consumption Investment
Orthogonalised g 2.96 2.87 2.08
Non-orthogonalised g 3.25 3.90 3.47
Table 2.1. First Stage F-statistics of Military News on Government Spending
2.4 Results
The impulse responses in Figure 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 show the responses of output, gov-
ernment spending, consumption, investment, real wage, and unemployment to a 1%
government spending shock. The bands are 68 percent confidence bands that are
based on Newey-West standard errors to account for serial correlation (Jordà, 2005).
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Linear High Disagreement Low Disagreement
Figure 2.2. Local Projection Impulse Responses of GDP and Government Spending to a
Government Spending Shock
Note: Response of output and government spending to a 1% government spending (Blanchard-Perotti)
shock. The black-lines show the response in a linear model. The red- and blue-lines show the state-
dependent responses in high and low disagreement regimes, respectively. The shaded area is 68 percent
confidence interval around the responses. The sample period is from 1970Q1 to 2018Q4.
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Linear High Disagreement Low Disagreement
Figure 2.3. Local Projection Impulse Responses of Consumption and Investment to a
Government Spending Shock
Note: Response of consumption and investment to a 1% government spending (Blanchard-Perotti)
shock. The black-lines show the response in a linear model. The red- and blue-lines show the state-
dependent responses in high and low disagreement regimes, respectively. The shaded area is 68 percent































































































Linear High Disagreement Low Disagreement
Figure 2.4. Local Projection Impulse Responses of Real Wage and Unemployment to a
Government Spending Shock
Note: Response of real wage and unemployment to a 1% government spending (Blanchard-Perotti)
shock. The black-lines show the response in a linear model. The red- and blue-lines show the state-
dependent responses in high and low disagreement regimes, respectively. The shaded area is 68 percent
confidence interval around the responses. The sample period is from 1970Q1 to 2018Q4.
52
2.4.1 Linear Effects
A useful starting point to examine how the responses of macroeconomic variables to
government spending shocks may vary with information frictions is to use a linear
method (which assumes that responses are invariant to the state of the economy), and
compare it to the literature.
Overall, the results here are similar to Ramey (2011) who, using various identi-
fication methods, finds that private spending falls after a government spending ex-
pansion. 15 The response of consumption is muted — it is mainly zero but becomes
slightly negative in the later horizons. Mountford and Uhlig (2009) also find negative
or no significant effect on consumption using a sign restrictions identified VAR. As
Ramey (2016) noted, this is consistent with evidence from estimated DSGE models
(such as Smets and Wouters (2007) and Cogan et al. (2010)) with results close to the
neoclassical model. In both cases, a government spending shock lowers consumption
and leads to multipliers below unity.
Output initially increases in response to an increased government spending but
becomes mostly zero in the medium run, and then becomes negative in the fourth
year. This linear response of output is closer to Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013)
than to Ramey and Zubairy (2018) that shows strong positive output response. We
can likely reconcile this difference with the sample period, with the former looking
at the period between 1985-2010, while the latter has a much longer sample period
(1889-2015).
While the neoclassical and Keynesian models have clear predictions on the re-
sponses of output and consumption to a government spending shock, the implications
on private investment is largely unsettled. The two theoretical models may predict
an increase or fall of private investment, depending on various conditions (Blanchard
and Perotti, 2002). For example, in the neoclassical model, a government spending
shock can raise private investment if the shock is sufficiently persistent (and taxes are
sufficiently nondistortionary). My results suggest, investment initially rises, where the
peak response of the central tendency rises to around 0.5%, but then falls to around
-1%. The initial crowding-in of private investment could be explained by the persis-
tent response of government spending, as shown in Figure 2.2. Other papers such as
15Ramey (2011) defines private spending as GDP minus government consumption and investment.
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Ramey and Zubairy (2018), Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Galí et al. (2007) also
show a persistent response of government spending to its own shock. Meanwhile, the
magnitude of the crowding-out effect in the later horizons is similar to Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2013) on the response of real private investment of OECD countries,
and Blanchard and Perotti (2002) who find the peak response of investment in the
United States to be −1%.
2.4.2 Non-Linear Effects
The non-linear responses to a government spending shock in Figure 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4
show how the linear results could mask the very different behaviour in the two states
— high and low information frictions (measured by disagreement).16 It is important
to re-emphasise at this point that I identify the shock the non-linearly, to be consistent
with non-linear local projections.17 This implies that the linear estimates, with linearly
identified shocks, should not necessarily lie between the two non-linear estimates.
The responses of consumption has the most conspicuous difference across the two
states. Under high disagreement, there is a persistent positive effect of a positive 1%
government spending shock. Consumption rises to its peak of 0.7% at around four
years’ horizon, whereas the linear model largely stays slightly below zero. This also
contrasts to the low disagreement regime, where consumption falls significantly to
around -0.5%.
The non-linear responses of output are alike in the two states, specifically in the
short-term (up to two quarters) at around 0.3% — similar to the linear IRF. But after
the first year, the positive response of output in high disagreement period is much
more persistent than in low disagreement, remaining above zero for at least 20 quar-
ters. Under low disagreement, the output goes to zero fairly quickly — becoming
statistically insignificant after 4 quarters, and the central tendency goes to zero after 7
quarters.
Investment falls almost immediately in high information frictions periods, with a
peak response of around -1%. While in low disagreement periods, there is a crowding-
in effect of investment in the first year, which goes to zero in the medium run and
16These results are robust to using alternative measure of disagreement in Appendix B.2.1.
17For example, see Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016) for the equivalent for monetary shocks.
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eventually is crowded-out after the fourth year.
In Figure 2.2, the responses of government spending to the shock are not statis-
tically significantly different in the two states, and in comparison to the linear re-
sponse. This indicates that the dynamics of government spending do not depend on
the informational frictions of the agents in the economy, and thus, the results that on
other macroeconomic aggregates, are not driven by different behaviour of government
spending in the two regimes.
In this paper, I highlight that a positive government spending shock is expansion-
ary (output rises), but the responses of consumption go in the opposite directions due
to the varying Ricardianness of households. The different behaviour of consumption
we observe during high and low disagreement regimes is attributed to information
frictions, and reconciles the predictions of both Keynesian and neoclassical models.
When there is high disagreement amongst professional forecasters — indicating large
information frictions at the time — households are less able to anticipate higher fu-
ture (distortionary) taxes. Furthermore, given that there are lags in the release of
information on government spending (for example, as part of GDP releases), it is also
plausible that households were not able to detect the rise in government spending in
real time. For instance, they could misattribute the rise of their disposable income due
to a positive productivity shock (which raises real wages), instead of a government
spending shock.
The labour market responses in the two regimes are also more suggestive of a role
of information frictions, rather than just credit or liquidity constraints. If credit or
liquidity constraints bind, creating the rule-of-thumb households of Galí et al. (2007),
it would suggest a very strong link between household income and consumption.
For example, as household incomes rise, this should relax the constraints, enabling
households to consume more. However, real wages under high disagreement rises
much more quickly than consumption, and does not fall under low disagreement
(unlike consumption).
On the other hand, the classic Ricardian equivalence (and its breaking due to in-
formational frictions) is more difficult to see in investment behaviour. There are two
competing effects. The standard neoclassical effect is the crowding out effect of higher
interest rates (as government spending is a positive demand shock, monetary policy
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should tighten to keep inflation under control) leading to higher borrowing rates, and
thus discourages investment. Alternatively, if agents anticipate higher capital taxes,
the marginal return to investing into an additional unit of capital is lower, and hence,
also discourages investment. On the other hand, firms need to invest into production
capacity in the future, as capital investments typically take some time to be converted
to production capacity. Basu and Kimball (2003) emphasise the need for costly invest-
ment planning in a DSGE model, to get investment to rise after a positive government
spending shock. Under low disagreement, investment rises in the beginning. Perhaps
this is due to confidence effects: firms anticipate greater future demand, but in the
longer run, crowding out dominates. With high disagreement, investment falls imme-
diately, suggesting firms do not anticipate higher future demand (despite output and
consumption increasing persistently in this regime). The crowding out effect due to
higher interest rates is easier to observe, and thus this effect dominates.
2.4.3 Multiplier
Table 2.2 shows the estimates of multipliers in different horizons for the linear model
and the state dependent model. As noted earlier, I use the Gordon and Krenn’s (2010)
transformation — dividing NIPA variables by an estimate of potential GDP such that
all NIPA variables are in the same unit, and so the multipliers can be calculated di-
rectly. In this paper, I define the cumulative multipliers as the cumulative gain of
GDP, private consumption, or private investment, relative to the cumulative govern-
ment spending. As Ramey and Zubairy (2018) argue, the integral (sum) of multipliers
address relevant policy question.18
In the linear model, the output multiplier is positive, but decreasing, until at
least 20 quarters. The consumption and investment multipliers are slightly positive
in the first 1–2 years and then it becomes negative. The output and consumption
multipliers are estimated to be higher in the high disagreement than in the low dis-
agreement regime. The stark difference in estimates across the two states imply that
18There are other definitions of a multiplier in a dynamic setting. Mountford and Uhlig (2009) and
Uhlig (2010) also calculate the multiplier as the integral of output response divided by the integral
of government spending response. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) define the multiplier as the ratio
of the peak response of NIPA variables to the initial government spending shock. Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013) define the multiplier as the average response of output and its components
to the initial government.
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the multipliers of output and consumption are more positively persistent in the high
disagreement regime.19
Meanwhile, the estimates of investment multipliers in the high and low disagree-
ment regime are not as significantly different as much as output and consumption. In
fact, we observe the multipliers to be low, with small variation. Similar to the IRFs in
Figure 2.3, these multipliers suggest crowding out effect on investment during high
information frictions period.
1-quarter 1-year 2-year 3-year 4-year 5-year
Output
Linear 1.26 0.97 0.82 0.57 0.35 0.13
High Disagreement 1.50 1.47 1.68 1.66 1.80 1.89
Low Disagreement 1.66 1.44 1.26 1.21 1.02 0.74
Consumption
Linear 0.12 0.08 -0.01 -0.13 -0.24 -0.42
High Disagreement 0.13 0.30 0.47 0.59 0.84 0.96
Low Disagreement 0.46 0.24 -0.09 -0.36 -0.67 -1.05
Investment
Linear 0.19 0.15 0.11 0.03 -0.07 -0.17
High Disagreement 0.09 -0.13 -0.20 -0.28 -0.30 -0.27
Low Disagreement 0.14 0.29 0.34 0.33 0.24 0.07
Table 2.2. Estimates of Multipliers Using Local Projections to a Government Spending Shock
Note: These are the cumulative multipliers defined as Mxh =
∑hi=0 xh
∑hi=0 gh
where xh is the dollar effect on
variable x of a one dollar increase in government spending at h quarters after the shock.
2.4.4 Policy Implications of Government Spending Shocks
A possible challenge to information frictions as an explanation of fiscal policy trans-
mission is the traditional Keynesian channels on why fiscal policy multipliers vary
during recessions and expansions. In recessions, there is more slack in the economy,
and thus crowding out effects (if any) are minimised. If times of severe information
19One may notice that the linear multipliers are sometimes not in between the high and low dis-
agreement multipliers. A conjecture for the source of this behaviour is the identification of non-linear
shocks in the state-dependent model.
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frictions is highly correlated with a slack measure, the result that expansionary power
of government spending is larger during high disagreement could be only picking up
these Keynesian effects.
However, as Table 2.3 shows, the correlation between the disagreement measures
and various measures of slack is only mildly positive.20 This suggests that high dis-
agreement episodes are somewhat more prevalent in recessions than expansions, but
recessions are certainly not the sole cause of high disagreement. Therefore, the re-
sponses of macroeconomic variables in the high and low disagreement regimes are
unlikely to be caused solely by (the lack of) crowding out effects, pointing towards
the role of time-varying information frictions instead.
Recession Slack
Disagreement 0.3773 0.2304
Table 2.3. Correlation of State Variables
Note: Disagreement is the baseline state variable in this paper, measured by the Survey of Professional
Forecasters current quarter (nowcast) of real GDP cross-sectional dispersion divided by median. Re-
cession is defined by NBER-dated recessions dates. Slack is defined as in Ramey and Zubairy (2018)
where unemployment is above or equal to 6.5%.
This also reflects the mixed takeaways from the literature on fiscal multipliers.
On one hand, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) find that multipliers are large
in recessions, and significantly larger than in expansions. On the other hand, with
a much longer sample going back to the 19th century, Ramey and Zubairy (2018)
find that multipliers are below unity, regardless of slack (with an exception to the
zero lower bound period, where spending multipliers are around 1.5). While there is
indeed a positive correlation between disagreement and slack, not all recessions are
accompanied with severe information frictions. Thus, the results suggest multipliers
are not necessarily larger in all recessions relative to expansions, but it may be the
case if the recession also brought on severe information frictions.
Another way to define the state of the business cycle is by looking at economic
20To ensure consistency with the local projections estimation, both the disagreement and slack mea-
sures are converted into an indicator variable.
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regimes under different uncertainty. Alloza (2017) estimate the impact of government
spending shock on economic activity in high and low uncertainty regimes, and re-
cession and boom. His results suggest that government spending is expansionary in
times of boom or low uncertainty, but contractionary in recession or high uncertainty
(unusually high stock market volatility) periods. This is in contrast to other existing
empirical results, for example Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012). Uncertainty is
frequently used in the empirical monetary policy literature to measure different state,
and is sometimes proxied by the cross-sectional dispersion in surveys of expecta-
tions. However, disagreement and uncertainty are conceptually different (Reis, 2018).
Additionally, Kozeniauskas et al. (2018) show the correlation between cross-sectional
dispersion in the Survey of Professional Forecasters and other measures of macroeco-
nomic uncertainty (for example, Jurado et al. (2015)) is at best weak. For this reason,
I do not draw a close analogy between the results of this paper and that of Alloza
(2017).
The key theme of this paper is that expectations formation matters, and in par-
ticular, how that determines the ability of households to monitor current economic
conditions and anticipate future future taxes. Monetary policymakers have long paid
attention to (inflation) expectations, which if anchored, helps the policymakers meet
their inflation targets. But typically, fiscal policymakers historically did not emphasise
the extent of information frictions as an important pillar of fiscal policy. The results of
this paper suggest the setting of fiscal policy should also consider households’ ability
to form expectations to determine its effectiveness.
2.5 Disaggregated Shocks
Similar to the variety of monetary policy instruments (ranging from policy interest
rates, asset purchases, and bank funding schemes), fiscal policy also has different
tools. In this section, I focus on the analysis of the responses of total output, private
consumption and private investment to an increase in government consumption, gov-
ernment investment and transfer payments. Just as the responses of macroeconomic
variables to a shock in government spending could differ according to the regime
in which they occur, they may also differ for different components of government
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spending (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012; Perotti et al., 2007). In particular, these
authors discuss how government consumption (government spending on goods and
services) and government investment operate through different mechanisms. Mean-
while, the response of macroeconomic variables to transfer payment shocks is rela-
tively unknown in the fiscal policy literature, despite its substantial size in the United
States (Romer and Romer, 2016; Oh and Reis, 2012). The heterogeneous mechanisms
I discuss here provide insights to policymakers when designing strategies to achieve
a particular desired outcome (for example, whether boosting consumption or invest-
ment is preferred), for a given state of the world.
At this point, it is important to note that the NIPA definition of total govern-
ment spending excludes transfer payments, as transfer payments are not purchases
of goods or services. During the sample period (1970-2018), nominal government
consumption accounts for 79% of total government spending on average, with gross
investment accounting for the other 21%, as illustrated in Figure B.2. Transfer pay-
ments accrue to the equivalent of 66% of total government spending (translating to
83% of government consumption). Figure B.3 shows the time series of government
spending, its components, and transfer payment in log dollars.
The first result to highlight is the response of private consumption to the disag-
gregated government shocks, and then how it compares to each other, as well as to
the baseline results of an overall government spending shock. Figure 2.5 shows that
private consumption rises to an increase of government consumption. The impulse
responses are similar to the response to a government spending shock. This is not
surprising as government consumption (government spending on goods and services)
accounts the largest part of non-transfer spending — on average, 80% of government
spending. A similar pattern can be seen in the response of consumption to transfer
payment shocks in Figure 2.7. It is intriguing that transfer payments, mostly com-
posed of social security benefits, also pushes up private consumption, persistently
under high information friction but not in the other regime.21
21Figure 2.9 shows the shock to transfer payment is much less persistent than government consump-
tion shocks.
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However, there are two notable differences between the effects of government
consumption and transfer payments shocks on private consumption. First, in high
disagreement periods, an increase of transfer payments has an immediate and persis-
tent positive effect on consumption, but in low disagreement, it has an insignificant
effect. This is perhaps because transfer payments are more predictable than govern-
ment spending or government consumption. Indeed in response to a 1% government
consumption shock, it takes about half-a-year for the state-dependent responses to
be statistically significantly different from zero during high disagreement, but dur-
ing low disagreement, the fall in private consumption becomes statistically significant
from zero after 1.5 years. Second, the magnitudes of the responses to the two shocks
are strikingly different. Given its average nominal size, a 1% transfer payments shock
is around 20% smaller than a 1% government consumption shock.22 Yet, the medium-
run private consumption impact of a government spending shock is more than twice
of transfer payments under high disagreement.23
A possible explanation for these two differences is through the different channels
the shocks operate through. Transfer payments work directly through increasing the
current income of households, often to lower-income households with likely high
marginal propensity to consume.24 This is consistent with the assumption of many
fiscal policy models where rule-of-thumb households choose to consume more in the
current period than to save for future tax rise (Galí et al., 2007). On the other hand,
government consumption works through indirect, general equilibrium channels. The
purchase of domestically produced goods and services by the government leads to
the standard Keynesian amplification channels through increased aggregate demand
and hiring.
22Table 2.4 shows, during high information frictions periods, a one dollar government consumption
increase leads to 2.95 dollars increase in private consumption, but only 0.71 cents to a one dollar
increase in transfer payment in Table 2.6. The IRFs for the shocks and dollar-change effects comparison
can be found in Figure 2.9 and Figure 2.8, respectively.
23As noted previously, Figure 2.9 shows the different shocks persistence, so it is more difficult to
compare the exact magnitude.
24In the United States, much of transfer payments is accounted by pensions. A lower-income house-






































































































































Real Output Real Consumption Real Investment
Linear High Disagreement Low Disagreement
Figure 2.5. Local Projection Impulse Responses to a 1% Government Consumption Shock
Note: The columns shows the response of output, private consumption, and private investment to a
1% positive shock of government consumption. In the first row, the black lines show the response in
a linear model, the red (blue) lines show the responses in the high (low) disagreement regimes. The
second, third and fourth row shows a 68% confidence interval. The sample period is 1970Q1-2018Q4.
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Linear High Disagreement Low Disagreement
Figure 2.6. Local Projection Impulse Responses to a 1% Government Investment Shock
Note: The columns shows the response of output, private consumption, and private investment to a
1% positive shock of government investment. In the first row, the black lines show the response in
a linear model, the red (blue) lines show the responses in the high (low) disagreement regimes. The
second, third and fourth row shows a 68% confidence interval. The sample period is 1970Q1-2018Q4.
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Linear High Disagreement Low Disagreement
Figure 2.7. Local Projection Impulse Responses to a 1% Transfer Payment Shock
Note: The columns shows the response of output, private consumption, and private investment to a
1% positive shock of transfer payment. In the first row, the black lines show the response in a linear
model, the red (blue) lines show the responses in the high (low) disagreement regimes. The second,
third and fourth row shows a 68% confidence interval. The sample period is 1970Q1-2018Q4.
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This contrasts with the behaviour of private investment. In the main result, with
a government spending shock, investment rises a little initially under low disagree-
ment, while it falls under high disagreement. However, to a government consumption
shock, private investment quickly falls under both regimes. Interestingly, it is clear
to see that the a 1% increase to government investment crowds-out consumption in
the linear case, as well as in high and low disagreement (thus, the response of con-
sumption is not state-dependent following government investment shocks). Yet, the
same shock crowds-in private investment during low disagreement periods for first
three years, and in the medium run, it crowds out private investment to about 0.5pp.
In high disagreement periods, an increase of government investment does not affect
private investment.
An explanation consistent with these results is the balancing role of supply (crowd-
ing out) and demand (firms under imperfect information that has to plan investment
in advance). Under low information frictions, firms could quickly identify the increase
in government investment spending (e.g. in infrastructure), increasing the marginal
returns of their own private investment (crowding in). This is the mechanism under-
lying in models with complementarities between public and private investment. With
high information frictions in contrast, this effect is not powerful enough to counteract
the crowding out effect of resources going towards government spending, and thus
private investment falls. This crowding out effect also dominates in response to a gov-
ernment consumption increase in both regimes, further underlining the importance
of the public-private investment complementarities channel.
This exercise also brings to light how the disaggregated shocks have different
transmission mechanism in comparison to the baseline exercise with total government
spending shock. In Figure 2.8, I compare the response of output, private consumption
and private investment in terms of dollar changes. The comparison in dollar changes
is more comparable across the different shocks than the previous responses in logs
because the graphs compare the different types of government spending shocks. This
is because a 1% shock to government consumption is much larger than a 1% shock to
government investment, simply because the former is larger on average.
These results show the macroeconomic impact depends on the type of govern-
ment spending. Overall, the disaggregated results are consistent with the channels
65
suggested by the main results, and seem to suggest different mechanisms are at work
across firms and households. Government consumption and transfer payments in-
fluences households’ behaviour the most, with only small effects on firms’ private
investment. The response of private investment to overall government spending is
primarily driven by the behaviour to government investment shocks. This indicates
that firms and households pay different attention to the different types of government
spending, and hence they react differently. Therefore, fiscal policymakers will bene-
fit from understanding the decision making process of firms and households to best
accomplish their objectives.
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●Government Spending Government Consumption Government Investment Transfer Payment
Figure 2.8. Local Projection Impulse Responses in Dollar Change
Note: The first row exhibit the linear responses, and the second and third row the state-dependent
responses (high and low information frictions, respectively) to a 1 dollar change in government spend-
ing shock, government consumption shock, government investment shock, or transfer payment shock.
The sample period is 1970Q1-2018Q4.
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Figure 2.9. Impulse Responses of Various Government Spending to Own Shocks
Note: Each chart shows the linear response black lines, and the state-dependent – high disagreement
and low disagreement – responses. The top left shows the response of government spending to a 1
dollar change in government spending, and similarly to government consumption, government invest-
ment and transfer payment. The sample period is 1970Q1-2018Q4.
1-quarter 1-year 2-year 3-year 4-year 5-year
Output
Linear 0.67 0.93 1.28 1.21 0.90 0.52
High Disagreement 0.76 1.62 2.95 3.47 3.69 3.73
Low Disagreement 1.61 1.12 0.69 0.64 0.23 -0.44
Consumption
Linear -0.11 0.34 0.55 0.44 0.21 -0.09
High Disagreement -0.03 0.96 1.88 2.29 2.66 2.88
Low Disagreement 0.16 -0.34 -1.04 -1.68 -2.59 -3.77
Investment
Linear -0.09 -0.13 -0.18 -0.29 -0.45 -0.62
High Disagreement -0.21 -0.49 -0.59 -0.70 -0.74 -0.72
Low Disagreement -0.16 -0.13 -0.24 -0.28 -0.44 -0.74
Table 2.4. Multipliers Using Local Projection to a Government Consumption Shock
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1-quarter 1-year 2-year 3-year 4-year 5-year
Output
Linear 1.92 0.89 0.06 -0.45 -0.67 -0.86
High Disagreement 1.97 0.88 0.08 -0.25 0.01 0.32
Low Disagreement 3.01 3.26 3.66 4.19 4.24 3.99
Consumption
Linear 0.33 -0.45 -1.10 -1.43 -1.61 -1.93
High Disagreement 0.08 -0.83 -1.39 -1.53 -1.38 -1.36
Low Disagreement 1.58 1.59 1.30 1.09 0.87 0.43
Investment
Linear 0.49 0.47 0.42 0.35 0.32 0.28
High Disagreement 0.39 0.19 0.04 -0.11 -0.12 -0.06
Low Disagreement 0.94 1.61 2.01 2.06 1.70 1.16
Table 2.5. Multipliers Using Local Projection to a Government Investment Shock
1-quarter 1-year 2-year 3-year 4-year 5-year
Output
Linear 0.32 0.04 -0.42 -0.56 -0.60 -0.42
High Disagreement 0.72 1.01 0.71 0.55 0.49 0.67
Low Disagreement 0.11 -0.35 -0.35 -0.10 0.24 0.54
Consumption
Linear 0.38 0.42 0.33 0.30 0.32 0.36
High Disagreement 0.64 1.04 1.20 1.27 1.39 1.48
Low Disagreement 0.13 0.06 0.12 0.27 0.48 0.64
Investment
Linear 0.08 -0.05 -0.32 -0.48 -0.52 -0.46
High Disagreement 0.08 -0.15 -0.53 -0.67 -0.60 -0.43
Low Disagreement -0.26 -0.63 -0.82 -0.89 -0.79 -0.66
Table 2.6. Multipliers Using Local Projection to a Transfer Payment Shock
Note: These are the cumulative multipliers defined as Mxh =
∑hi=0 xh
∑hi=0 gh
where xh is the dollar effect on
variable x of a one dollar increase in government spending at h quarters after the shock.
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2.6 Robustness
2.6.1 Placebo Test: Responses to Government Spending Shocks
Given that I use purely time-series variation in disagreement, I investigate the plausi-
ble role of structural change in the economy driving the results across the two regimes.
To do so, I create a placebo test — where I divide the ‘regime’ into two time periods
— and see whether these artificial pseudo-regimes also create meaningful differences
that could account for the results I find. I focus on three different time periods as
threshold to reflect possible changes in the economy: 1983Q3 (Placebo 1), 1989Q1
(Placebo 2), and 1992Q1 (Placebo 3). Here, I focus on the responses to a government
spending shock, but for completeness, I also include the impulse responses to the
disaggregated shocks in the next subsection.
First, I examine the role of the Great Inflation (GI) of the 1970s and the Great
Moderation (GM) (including the Great Recession periods, post Global Financial Cri-
sis) periods. There is a well-known large literature around the causes of the Great
Moderation, so I place the most weight of importance on Placebo 1. The threshold
is the start of Great Moderation in 1983Q3 (Stock and Watson, 2002). I compare the
responses of output, government spending, consumption and investment in Figure
2.10 to the baseline responses in Figure 2.2 and 2.3.
In the baseline case, much of high disagreement periods coincide with the GI
period, and vice versa, periods of low disagreement coincide with the GM period. In
the IRFs, the responses in the high disagreement and Great Inflation period is shown
by the red line, and the responses in the low disagreement and Great Moderation
period is shown by the blue dotted-line.
One of the key differences between the baseline exercise in the previous sections
and in these placebo tests is the response of government spending to its own shock.
In the main result, the response of government spending is similar in the high and
low disagreement regime (and in the linear estimation). Meanwhile, for example,
here the response during GI is much less persistent (goes to zero by the fourth year)
and this is significantly different to the response in the GM period. This supports
the main analysis that the overlapping responses of government spending in the two
disagreement regimes indicate that the path of government spending is independent
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to expectation formation of economic agents, albeit the effects of government spending
on macroeconomic variables can be affected by expectations formation.
The dynamic responses of output during the GM and low disagreement regime
are both significantly positive only up to one year and becomes zero afterwards. The
peak positive output response during GI is similar to the positive peak response dur-
ing high disagreement period (around 1%), but it quickly goes back to zero (even
slightly negative at -0.75%). This strongly contrasts to the behaviour under high dis-
agreement in the main result, even when most of the GI period is classified as a
high disagreement regime. This suggests that the high disagreement dynamics is not
driven purely by the GI period.
The central tendencies of the consumption response in GM and low disagreement
period are similar — slightly positive but becomes negative after one year. But, while
the main result shows significant negative response of consumption after 2 years, the
response of consumption during Great Moderation is statistically insignificant from
zero at all periods. The pattern of the response of investment is also similar in the
baseline and placebo test, but only up to 15 quarters.
The more notable difference comes from the responses of consumption and invest-
ment during GI and the high disagreement period. In the main result, the response
of consumption is persistently positive throughout all 20 quarters. However, in the
placebo test, the consumption response is slightly negative for 2 years (quarters 6 to
14). Moreover, where in the main result the response of investment is mostly negative,
in the placebo test it is positive from quarter 4 to 8. Thus, like output, I conclude that
the behaviour of consumption in the high disagreement regime is not purely due to
the GI period.25
Second, I look at the responses of the same variables as above, but for the time
period of pre- and post-1989. Throughout the year 1989 and 1990, the US economy
was weakening, and entered a short recession. The early 1990s recession saw limited
expansion, oil price shock, and sluggish employment recovery. This highlights one of
the analysis in the paper that high disagreement periods are only weakly correlated
with recession. As we see in Figure 2.10, the periods in early 1990, saw mostly periods
25The non-monotonic response of output during the Great Inflation period can perhaps be explained
by the responses of consumption and investment in the same period, and also the larger response of
investment during Great Inflation period.
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of low disagreement.
Third, I examine the responses of macroeconomic variables for the time period
of pre- and post- 1992. The choice to divide the sample period in this way is due to
the history of the Survey of Professional Forecasters. The Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia took over the SPF since 1990, and in 1992, they started to survey for the
forecasts of GDP instead of GNP.26 If GDP was more predictable and/or less volatile
than GNP, then that would naturally create lower disagreement across forecasters.
However, as seen in Figure A.3.5, GNP tracks GDP extraordinarily closely. This elim-
inates the possibility that the change (lessening) in disagreement is due to forecasters
finding it easier to forecast GDP than GNP.
The state-dependent responses of the macroeconomic variables using Placebo 2
and Placebo 3, are in general similar. To recall, many of the high disagreement peri-
ods happened at the beginning of the sample. Thus, the similarities in some of these
responses are mechanical. For example, we observe a slightly more expansionary
effects of a 1% government spending shock in latter half of the sample. We also ob-
serve similar patterns of the responses of real private consumptions as in the baseline
exercise. However, upon a closer look, we see more differences in the responses of
government spending and real private investment. This indicates that the information
frictions channel provide additional explanation to the state-dependent responses of
some macroeconomic variables following an increase in government spending. There-
fore, while Placebos 2 and 3 are not as useful as Placebo 1, it is particularly important
that Placebo 1 suggests that the transition to the Great Moderation did not contribute
to the main results. This explicitly tests out for the structural change in the United
States that is well-documented by the huge literature on the Great Moderation (Stock
and Watson, 2003).
26The SPF began in 1968 and was conducted by the American Statistical Association and the Na-
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Figure 2.10. Impulse Responses to a 1% Government Spending Shock with Placebo States
Note: Responses to a 1% government spending shock. Each column corresponds to different definition
of ‘state’ – Disagreement, Placebo1, Placebo 2 and Placebo 3. The red lines show the responses in high
information frictions, the Great Inflation period, before 1989Q1, and before 1992Q1, respectively. The
blue lines show the responses in low information frictions, after 1983Q2 (Great Moderation), after
1989Q1, and after 1992Q1, respectively. The black lines are the linear response (central tendency). The
shaded region is 68% confidence interval. The sample period is 1970Q1-2018Q4.
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Placebo Test 1: Great Inflation vs Great Moderation
1-quarter 1-year 2-year 3-year 4-year 5-year
Output
Great Inflation 1.02 1.10 1.29 0.18 0.05 0.63
Great Moderation 1.37 1.08 0.76 0.77 0.70 0.56
Consumption
Great Inflation -0.36 -0.17 -0.06 -0.21 0.33 1.06
Great Moderation 0.42 0.42 0.34 0.30 0.22 0.05
Investment
Great Inflation 0.06 -0.37 -0.28 -0.58 -0.94 -1.12
Great Moderation 0.27 0.34 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.28
Placebo Test 2
1-quarter 1-year 2-year 3-year 4-year 5-year
Output
1970Q1-1983Q2 0.50 -0.03 0.47 0.62 0.96 1.45
1983Q3-2018Q4 2.12 1.91 1.27 1.00 0.43 -0.04
Consumption
1970Q1-1983Q2 -0.05 0.14 0.54 0.83 1.29 1.70
1983Q3-2018Q4 0.46 0.48 0.25 0.01 -0.35 -0.73
Investment
1970Q1-1983Q2 -0.07 -0.53 -0.72 -0.94 -1.15 -1.33
1983Q3-2018Q4 0.40 0.59 0.46 0.25 0.02 -0.19
Placebo Test 3
1-quarter 1-year 2-year 3-year 4-year 5-year
Output
1970Q1-1991Q4 1.21 1.21 1.61 1.59 1.82 1.97
1992Q1-2018Q4 2.03 1.75 1.40 1.45 1.17 0.81
Consumption
1970Q1-1991Q4 0.20 0.45 0.71 0.86 1.19 1.34
1992Q1-2018Q4 0.16 -0.06 -0.49 -0.89 -1.45 -1.99
Investment
1970Q1-1991Q4 0.01 -0.23 -0.29 -0.43 -0.52 -0.58
1992Q1-2018Q4 0.34 0.62 0.65 0.58 0.36 0.07
Table 2.7. Estimates of Multipliers using Local Projection to a Government Spending Shock
with Time Placebo as Threshold
Note: These are the cumulative multipliers defined as Mxh =
∑hi=0 xh
∑hi=0 gh
where xh is the dollar effect on
variable x of a one dollar increase in government spending at h quarters after the shock.
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Figure 2.11. Impulse Responses to a 1% Government Consumption Shock with Placebo States
Note: Responses to a 1% government consumption shock. Each column corresponds to different
definition of ‘state’ — Disagreement, Placebo1, Placebo 2 and Placebo 3. The red lines show the re-
sponses in high information frictions, the Great Inflation period, before 1989Q1, and before 1992Q1,
respectively. The blue lines show the responses in low information frictions, after 1983Q2 (Great Mod-
eration), after 1989Q1, and after 1992Q1, respectively. The black lines are the linear response (central
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Figure 2.12. Impulse Responses to a 1% Government Investment Shock with Placebo States
Responses to a 1% government investment shock. Each column corresponds to different definition
of ‘state’ — Disagreement, Placebo1, Placebo 2 and Placebo 3. The red lines show the responses in
high information frictions, the Great Inflation period, before 1989Q1, and before 1992Q1, respectively.
The blue lines show the responses in low information frictions, after 1983Q2 (Great Moderation), after
1989Q1, and after 1992Q1, respectively. The black lines are the linear response (central tendency). The


















































0 4 8 12 16 20
Quarters
















































0 4 8 12 16 20
Quarters
















































0 4 8 12 16 20
Quarters


















































0 4 8 12 16 20
Quarters
Disagreement Placebo 1 Placebo 2 Placebo 3
Figure 2.13. Impulse Responses to a 1% Transfer Payment Shock with Placebo States
Responses to a 1% transfer payment shock. Each column corresponds to different definition of ‘state’ —
Disagreement, Placebo1, Placebo 2 and Placebo 3. The red lines show the responses in high information
frictions, the Great Inflation period, before 1989Q1, and before 1992Q1, respectively. The blue lines
show the responses in low information frictions, after 1983Q2 (Great Moderation), after 1989Q1, and
after 1992Q1, respectively. The black lines are the linear response (central tendency). The shaded region
is 68% confidence interval. The sample period is 1970Q1-2018Q4.
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2.7 Conclusion
Do information frictions affect the transmission of government spending shocks? Yes.
The results across the two regimes — high and low disagreement of real output now-
casts by professional forecasters, which I use to proxy the degree of information fric-
tions – can be summarised as follows. In response to an increase in government
spending, consumption rises strongly and persistently in times of high information
frictions. This contrasts with the low information frictions regime, where consump-
tion falls to the same government spending shock.
The key intuition of the empirical results is that when households are less able to
identify economic shocks — including government spending — in real time, and fore-
cast future tax rates, households’ consumption respond positively to the government
spending increase. In addition to the greater consumption response in magnitude, the
rise in consumption also persists for longer. I also show evidence from labour mar-
ket variables that suggest credit or liquidity constraints are less likely to explain the
dynamic heterogeneities across the two regimes, relative to the information-frictions
based explanation. The lack of a strong correlation between the disagreement state
variable, and slack variables suggests that the identification of the regimes are not
likely to be driven by recessionary times, which are likely to bring other channels.
This result bridges the Keynesian and neoclassical theoretical literature together
(and their respective supporting empirical literature). I show evidences that channels
from the two strands operate, but which dominates appear to depend on the extent
of information frictions at a given time. This creates time-variation in the Ricardian-
ness of agents, and as a result, agents can appear both Keynesian and neoclassical at
different regimes.
Lastly, to shed more light on the transmission channels, I examine the responses to
shocks of the disaggregated components of government spending (consumption and
investment) as well as transfer payments. Information frictions affect the behaviour of
household (consumption) the most in response to shocks in government consumption
and transfer payment. On the other hand, these two shocks only have small effects
on firms (investment) but government investment shocks influence it more, shaping
its overall response to total government spending. These results indicate that firms
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and households pay heterogeneous attention to the different types of government
spending, and hence, they react differently. Therefore, fiscal policymakers benefit
from understanding the decision making process of firms and households in order to
use different tools that best achieve their policy goals.
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Chapter 3
Sticky Information and the Effects of
Government Spending Shocks
3.1 Introduction
How do government spending shocks transmit to the real economy? This is an age-
old question in macroeconomics. It is also ever more important in a low interest rate
environment, where fiscal policy is expected to be more active to compensate for the
reduced effectiveness of monetary policy close to the zero lower bound (Bernanke,
2020). There is still little agreement in the literature of how government spending
shocks propagate through the economy. Empirically, in the previous chapter of this
thesis, I reconcile the Keynesian and neoclassical predictions of fiscal policy — with
a focus on explaining the varying response of private consumption to a government
spending shock. I do this by emphasising the importance of information frictions.
While there are many models on information frictions to explain its effects on
the transmission of monetary shocks, there is surprisingly little on its role on fiscal
shocks. In this chapter, I build on the sticky information setup in Mankiw and Reis
(2007) to provide a quantitative framework on how information frictions could affect
the response of consumption to a government spending shock, and thus the associated
fiscal multipliers. In this setup, only a fraction of the agents in the economy update
their information about the state of the economy in that period (in effect, acting as
the Calvo fairy in typical New Keynesian models). This friction creates nominal and
real rigidities, as the agents that do not update correspondingly do not react to shocks
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occurring in that period.
I merge this setup with the seminal work of Galí et al. (2007) — in particular, the
addition of ‘rule-of-thumb’ households.1 These households cannot participate in asset
markets to borrow or save, and thus simply consume their after-tax labour income.
How does this help explain the empirical results in my previous chapter — that in
periods of severe information frictions, consumption rise after a positive government
spending shock, and contrarily, consumption falls when information frictions are not
prevalent? The intuition is that, in this setup, there are effectively three types of
households in the period of a positive government spending shock: (1) ‘optimising’
households that update, (2) optimising households that do not update (and thus, do
not realise the shock has occurred), and (3) rule-of thumb households.2 The rule-of-
thumb households behave in a similar way as in Galí et al. (2007) — the increase in
labour demand correspondingly increases their labour income, and thus their con-
sumption rises.
The information frictions primarily act upon the optimising households.3 When
information frictions are prevalent — few optimising households update — then few
households identify the shock. Correspondingly, few households save in advance of
higher future taxes (optimising households that do not update their information also
do not update their consumption plans). Therefore, aggregate consumption rises as
the increase in the rule-of-thumb households’ consumption dominate. In contrast,
when information frictions are less important, the effect of the Ricardian optimising
households dominate as many households save after the government spending shock,
and thus aggregate consumption falls.
I explore the mechanisms of the model through various sensitivity analyses in
Section 3.3.1 and demonstrate how variations in information frictions could produce
different directions of consumption responses. I find that all three forms of infor-
mation frictions (i.e. the inattentive consumers, workers and firms) contribute to
1In the recent heterogeneous agent New Keynesian (HANK) literature, these type of households
are also known as hand-to-mouth consumers.
2The model in the next section clearly identifies the set of households that update in the same
period as the government spending shock (household type (1)), as well as the optimising households
that do not update contemporaneously following a government spending shock (household type (2)).
The latter set of households will update their information in the future periods with some probability.
3The rule-of-thumb households are not directly affected by the information stickiness per se, but
are of course affected by general equilibrium effects through factor markets.
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producing the heterogeneity in consumption responses. The information friction that
appears to have the largest effect on consumption behaviour is the consumers, as
could be expected. This determines the proportion of Ricardian households who are
able to observe and respond contemporaneously. Additionally, information rigidities
on Ricardian households’ workers prevent real wages from falling, which helps the
consumption boom. Also, sticky information on price-setting slows down price ad-
justment, which dampens the crowding out effect of rising real interest rates so that
Ricardian households do not reduce their consumption by too much. Moreover, it
turns out that at least some information frictions in all three agents are necessary to
reproduce the empirical consumption response in the previous chapter. But I also
observe that the effects of each of these information frictions do not compound off
one another.
The existing literature show New Keynesian models that incorporate nominal
rigidities into the neoclassical framework exhibit the same wealth effect as a neoclas-
sical model that crowds out consumption after an expansionary fiscal shock. However,
in the more recent theoretical models, replicating the empirically relevant ‘crowding-
in’, co-movement of consumption with government spending within a DSGE frame-
work is possible by adding extra elements, although it remains challenging (Jacob,
2015). These elements include rule-of-thumb households (Galí et al., 2007; Furlanetto,
2011), deep habit formation (Ravn et al., 2007; Jacob, 2015), government-in-utility spec-
ification (Linnemann and Schabert, 2004), and non-separability between consumption
and leisure (GHH preferences) (Monacelli and Perotti, 2008; Christiano et al., 2011;
Bilbiie, 2011). Other papers also combine some of these methods, for example, com-
bining a complementarity between private and public spending with habit formation
(Bouakez and Rebei, 2007), or with GHH preferences (Ganelli and Tervala, 2009).
However, there is limited work on explaining how government spending can stimu-
late consumption using information frictions. An exception to this is Murphy (2015),
who builds on the imperfect information framework of Lucas (1972) and Lorenzoni
(2009) to provide an alternative explanation of the positive consumption multiplier
based on a positive wealth effect.
In Reis (2006a), the role of rule-of-thumb households is reflected by inattentive
consumers and inattentive savers. Households differ by costs-to-planning and income
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risk, and self-select to either plan consumption, or plan savings. Those who choose
to plan savings (‘inattentive savers’) rationally choose not to plan consumption (as it
is costly to update plan) and absorb all of their income fluctuations in consumption.
In other words, they live hand-to-mouth. In contrast, ‘inattentive consumers’ ratio-
nally choose to plan consumption as the cost-to-planning is relatively low, similar to
the Ricardian households in my model (they sporadically update). The Reis (2006a)
‘inattentive consumer’ model implies one-third of U.S. population chooses to never
plan — that is, the rule-of-thumb households.
Hurst (2003) uses data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and finds
that households who reach retirement with low wealth also have a larger drop in
consumption at retirement (consistent with inadequate planning for retirement). The
panel component of the PSID show that these households had consumption growth
that responded to predictable increases and declines in income during their working
years, while no such behaviour found among other pre-retired households. He finds
this behaviour to be inconsistent with liquidity constraints, precautionary savings
or habit formation, but can be explained by rule-of-thumb behaviour (where they
follow a near-sighted consumption plans during their working lives). This evidence
also supports the role of rule-of-thumb behaviour and inattentive households in this
paper.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 sets up the sticky information
general equilibrium model with rule-of-thumb households. It also provides details
on the optimising behaviour, as well as assumptions on information of each agent in
the economy. Section 3.3 describes the parameter calibrations and the main results,
including the sensitivity analysis. I include some fiscal policy discussion in Section
3.4, and the final section concludes.
3.2 Model Setup
The sticky information general equilibrium (SIGE) model of Mankiw and Reis (2007)
and Reis (2009) is similar to the neoclassical (full-information rational expectations)
model, but with one different assumption on the information structure. In SIGE,
while the expectations of each ‘inattentive agent’ are formed rationally, they do not
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necessarily act upon all the available information at each point in time. It implicitly
assumes that there are fixed costs of acquiring, absorbing and processing information,
such that agents optimally choose to only update their information sporadically (Reis,
2006a,b). The key difference between this paper and the SIGE model is the addition
of rule-of-thumb households á la Galí et al. (2007).
In this section, I set out the assumptions on information of each agent in the
economy, as well as their optimising behaviour. However, it would be useful to first
understand how the agents meet at every period in three sets of markets as described
in Reis (2009). There are three markets: the goods market, the bond market and the
labour market. Information frictions — in the form of sticky information — exist in
each of these markets, but not all agents are inattentive. The mathematical detail of
the remaining ‘attentive agents’ is left to Appendix C.1.
One, in the goods market, monopolistically-competitive firms sell varieties of
goods to households. The pricing department of these firms face information fric-
tion. These inattentive price-setters update their information set with a probability λ.







where pt is the aggregate price and pt,j is the price of firm j at time t, which was last
updated at t− j. In other words, pt,j reflects the optimal price at time t that the firm
expects at time t− j. The higher the λ, the more current prices reflect the expectations
of firms that updated recently.4 On the other hand, the purchasing consumer (’pur-
chasers’ who buy from the continuum of firms and responsible for aggregating up the
consumption basket) do not face information frictions — that is, she is an attentive
agent.
Two, in the bond market (a market for savings), the saver-planner consumers
(’consumers’ who dictate how much overall to consume and save) trade bonds and
interest rates change to balance borrowing and lending. In this paper, the bonds also
finance government budget deficits. These inattentive consumers update their informa-
4Note that the Phillips curve, the IS curve and the wage curve is carefully derived later in this
section and in Appendix C. See Eq (3.41) for the details of the optimal price pt,j, Eq (3.25) for optimal
consumption ct,j, and Eq (3.31) for optimal wages wt,j — where “optimal” means that the agent has the
latest information set.
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tion set with a probability δ. The equilibrium in the bond market leads to an IS curve






where cot is the aggregate consumption of the Ricardian households, and c
o
t,j is the
consumption of Ricardian households j at time t, which was last updated at t− j. The
higher the δ, the larger is the proportion of informed (and optimising) consumers
who respond to shocks immediately.
Three, the labour market features workers on the supply side, and the labour
packer and firms on the demand side. The labour packer bundles the differentiated
labour input into a homogeneous labour input available for production by the firms.
The labour packer and the hiring department of a firm are ‘attentive agents’. On the
supply side, there are monopolistically-competitive households who sell varieties of
labour to the labour packer. These inattentive workers update their information set
with a probability ω. The equilibrium in the labour market leads to a wage curve (of






where wot is the aggregate wage of the Ricardian households, and w
o
t,j is the wage of
Ricardian households j at time t, which was last updated at t− j. The higher the ω, the
larger is the proportion of informed (and optimising) workers who respond to shocks
immediately.
3.2.1 Households
I assume a continuum of infinitely-lived households. A fraction (1− χ) of households
have access to the bond markets where they can trade a full set of contingent secu-
rities. I use the term optimising or Ricardian interchangeably to refer to this subset of
households. These households face information frictions in the form of sticky infor-
mation. The remaining fraction χ of households do not own any assets or have any
debt, and just consume their current labour income net of taxes. I refer to them as
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rule-of-thumb households.5
If all (inattentive) agents are fully informed, the model structure collapses to Galí
et al. (2007) with no nominal rigidities. Here, nominal rigidites arise from the sticky
information on firms (creating sticky prices) and on workers (creating sticky nominal
wages).














Ct,j and Lt,j is the consumption and labour supply by agent j at time t. θ is the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution and ψ is the Frisch elasticity of labour supply.
This utility function will be subject to a budget constraint that would be specific to the
optimising household and the rule-of-thumb household, which I describe in detail in
the following subsections.
Optimising Households
















where β is the discount factor, Cot,j is the consumption of the optimising household j,
Wt,j
Pt is the real wage for L
o
t,j labour supply of the optimising household j, and Rt is the
real interest rate factor.
Saver-planners
The saver-planner j enters the period with real bonds Bot,j, uses some of it to consume,
earns labour income and pays lump-sum taxes Tot,j. Included in this lump-sum taxes
5Galí et al. (2007) describe different interpretations for that behaviour include myopia, lack of access
to capital markets, fear of saving, ignorance of intertemporal trading opportunities.
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are also profits and losses from firms, and payments from an insurance contract that
all households signed at date t = 0, which ensures that at every period they are all
left with the same wealth. Moreover, j = 0 denotes the agent (here, saver-planner)
who forms expectations rationally based on up-to-date information.
The dynamic program that characterises the saver-planner’s problem is tedious
and is therefore covered in Appendix C.3. The optimality conditions of the saver-
planners from their optimisation are:
(Cot,0)













The first equation above is the standard Euler equation for an agent that updates at
that point in time (’well-informed’). It states that the marginal utility of consuming
today is equal to the expected discounted marginal utility of consuming tomorrow
multiplied by the return on savings. The second equation notes that agents who do
not update at that point (rather, their information set was updated j periods ago)
set their marginal utility of consumption to what they expect it would be with full
information.
Workers
The optimising workers supply labour input to a ‘labour packer firm’ (see Subsection
3.2.3), who will then combine it with the labour supply from the rule-of-thumb house-
holds. The Ricardian workers’ aim is to minimise their expected discounted disutility
of labour. The dynamic program that characterises the workers’ problem is even more





































Eq (3.6) is the intertemporal labour supply Euler equation for a well-informed worker.
If the elasticity of substitution across labour varieties γt is fixed, the marginal disutil-
ity of supplying labour today (divided by the real wage today) equates the discounted
marginal disutility tomorrow (divided by the the real wage tomorrow) times the in-
terest rate. This is much akin to the standard labour supply condition under full in-
formation, combined with the consumption Euler equation. With time-varying γt, the
labour supply Euler equation takes into account the change in the mark-up charged
by the monopolistic worker.6
Inattentiveness of Optimising Households
There is a fraction δ of consumers (saver-planners) and a fraction ω of workers in the
optimising households who update their information. Thus, every period, there are δ
consumers who have current information, δ(1− δ) with one-period-old information,
δ(1− δ)2 with two-period-old information, and so on. Because agents only differ on
the date at which they last updated, we can group them and let j denote how long
ago the optimising consumers last updated. Likewise, ω of workers update their
information set, and they can be grouped into groups of j of size ω(1−ω)j.
Rule-of-Thumb Households
The rule-of-thumb households are assumed to behave in a ‘hand-to-mouth’ fashion,
fully consuming their current after-tax labour income. These agents differ from the
optimising agents because they cannot smooth consumption through bond holdings.
Thus, they do not smooth their consumption path in the face of fluctuations in labour
income, nor do they intertemporally substitute in response to changes in interest rates.
Following Galí et al. (2007), I abstract from the sources of that behaviour. The litera-
ture, for instance, attribute it to a combination of lack of access to financial markets,




6The left-hand side of this Eq (3.6) reflects the intratemporal problem, substituted into the con-
sumption Euler equation in Eq (3.4).
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where the lump-sum taxes paid by the rule-of-thumb households Trt can differ from
those paid by the optimising households Tot . Under the assumption of a competitive








Aggregate consumption and labours are given by a weighted average of the corre-
sponding variable for each household type
Ct ≡ χCrt + (1− χ)Cot (3.8)
Lt ≡ χLrt + (1− χ)Lot (3.9)
3.2.2 Firms
There is a monopolistically-competitive firm that produces each variety of good i.
Each of these firms, indexed by j, operates a technology that uses labour input Lt,j
supplied by the labour packer at a single cost Wt to produce good i under diminishing
returns to scale α ∈ (0, 1) and a common technology shock At. The firm’s pricing
department (the price-setters) is in charge of setting the price Pt,j and selling the













The Et−j(.) expectations operator of the pricing department of firm j depends on its
information. This is subject to the production function
Yt,j = AtLαt,j (3.11)
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where Ct,j(i) is the consumption of variety i by household j at time t, and Gt is the
exogenous government spending. Yt,i is the total production of good i at time t. In
equilibrium Yt,i = Yt,j, and Pt(i) = Pt,j as each good is produced by a unique firm.












I leave the mathematical details in Appendix C.2.
3.2.3 Labour Packer
The labour packer receives a supply of differentiated labour input from the optimis-
ing and rule-of-thumb households. They bundle these differentiated labour input




WtLt −Wot Lot −Wrt Lrt (3.14)
subject to Lt =
[









σ is the elasticity of substitution across the two household types. This should be
contrasted to γ which is the elasticity of substitution across households but within
a household type. The first-order condition of this optimisation problem gives the
labour demand schedule for the optimising and rule-of-thumb household, respec-
tively:













and this gives the wage index
Wt =
[
(1− χ)(Wot )1−σ + χ(Wrt )1−σ
] 1
1−σ (3.17)
While Ricardian and rule-of-thumb households can have different wages, the monop-
olistic firms will face a single wage to pay to the labour packer. Therefore, this retains
the tractability of the SIGE model with only one type of household. The complete
derivation can be found in Appendix C.1.1.
3.2.4 Market Clearing
The market clearing condition is
Yt = Gt + Ct (3.18)
Here, government spending behaves exogenously as the government spending shock.
This is slightly different to Mankiw and Reis (2007) where government spending is a
proportion of consumption, which they interpret broadly as an aggregated demand
shock.
3.2.5 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy is set according to a Taylor rule






where φπ > 1 and a positive εt corresponds to an expansionary shock.
3.2.6 Fiscal Policy




= Bt + Gt (3.20)
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where Tt ≡ χTrt + (1− χ)Tot . I set the steady-state zero net supply of bonds (and thus,
a balanced primary budget). The fiscal policy rule takes the following form
tt = φbbt + φggt (3.21)
where tt ≡ Tt−TY , bt ≡
Bt−B
Y , and φb and φg are positive constants.
3.2.7 The Log-Linearised Economy and Shocks
I log-linearise the equilibrium conditions around the non-stochastic steady state. Small
caps denote the log-deviations of the respective large capitalised variable from this
steady state, with a few exceptions: ν̃t and γ̃t which are the log-deviations of νt and
γt. r̃t which is the log-deviation of the short rate EtRt+1 and for clarity, rt is the






Lastly, as noted before, tt ≡ Tt−TY and bt ≡
Bt−B
Y .
From the inattentive saver-planner’s problem of the Ricardian households:
cot,0 = Et(c
o




Iterating the two equations above, we get the first equation below. The second equa-
tion below is the log-linearised IS curve of the optimising households:






From the problem of the rule-of-thumb households, and the aggregation of the
two households types:








ct = χcrt + (1− χ)cot (3.28)




Similarly from the inattentive worker’s problem:





(γ− 1) = Et
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Combining and iterating the two equations above, we get the first equation below. The
































The labour packer production function (setting the elasticity of substitution σ = 1),
and the resulting optimisation results in the following linearised equations:
lt = χlrt + (1− χ)lot (3.34)
lot = lt + σ(wt − wot ) (3.35)
lrt = lt + σ(wt − wrt) (3.36)
wt = χwrt + (1− χ)wot (3.37)
From the inattentive firm’s problem results in these linearised price-setting equations
yt,j = at + αlt,j (3.38)
yt,j = yt − ν(pt,j − pt) (3.39)
pt,j = Et−j
[









α(wt − pt) + (1− α)yt − at − α ν̃t(ν−1)







(1− λ)j pt,j (3.42)
Finally, log-linearising the market clearing conditions and monetary policy rules leads
to (the fiscal rule in Eq (3.21) is already linearised)
yt = θGgt + θCct (3.43)
it = φππt − εt (3.44)
it = r̃t + Etπt+1 (3.45)
There are five source of shocks in the model: government spending, monetary policy,
aggregate productivity growth, goods markups and labour markups. Each of these
shock follow an independent AR(1) process:
gt = ρggt−1 + e
g
t (3.46)
εt = ρεεt−1 + eεt (3.47)
at = ρzat−1 + eat (3.48)
ν̃t = ρνν̃t−1 + eνt (3.49)
γ̃t = ργγ̃t−1 + e
γ
t (3.50)
where the shocks est N(0, σ
2
s ) are i.i.d over time. However, for the purpose of this
paper, I will focus purely on the government spending shock.
I solve the model using perturbations, and truncate the lags of Eq (3.26), (3.32)
and (3.42) to 24 lags. I have also compared the solution to when I truncate the lags
up to 64 lags, but this does not make any quantitatively significant differences to the
solution truncated to 24 lags.7
7Verona and Wolters (2014) follow a similar strategy, but with 16 lags. Therefore, I have a more




Each period is assumed to correspond to a quarter — setting the discount factor β to
the standard 0.99. Then, I calibrate the following parameters to the estimated posterior
mean of Reis (2009), setting ν = 10.09, γ = 9.09, ψ = 5.15 and θ = 1. As in the baseline
calibration of Galí et al. (2007), I set φπ = 1.5, θG = 0.2, ρg = 0.9, φg = 0.1 and φb =
0.33. The proportion of rule-of-thumb households λ is set to 0.25.8 The labour share
α is set to 2/3, and σ = 1 indicates a Cobb-Douglas input to the labour packer. The
baseline setting for the sticky information parameters follows the estimated parameter
values in Mankiw and Reis (2007) (MR07) with δ = 0.176, ω = 0.21 and λ = 0.657, and
I will explore the behaviour of the model under various degrees of inattentiveness.9
Next, as a starting point, I change the three inattentiveness parameters equally
under different calibrations. Note that δ = ω = λ = 1 indicate full attentiveness or
full information, and δ = ω = λ = 0 is when agents are fully inattentive. In the next
section, I will explore the role of individual parameters. The parameters governing
the inattentiveness of the optimising consumers δ, workers ω and firms λ are set to
vary in impulse responses in Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3.
The response of consumption to a 1% government spending shock varies in the
sign across different degrees of inattentiveness. When δ = ω = λ = 0.65 (agents
updating relatively quickly — on average every 1.5 quarters), Ricardian households
strongly reduce their consumption, in line with the neoclassical effects. This is be-
cause the rise in aggregate demand increases inflation, resulting in a monetary policy
response that raises the real interest rate. By the consumption Euler equation, opti-
mising households’ consumption falls, and drives the overall reduction in aggregate
consumption.
In contrast, when agents are highly inattentive δ = ω = λ = 0.125 (updating
less often — on average every 2 years), aggregate consumption rises instead. This is
due to relatively muted effects of the Ricardian households, as only a few of them
8Galí et al. (2007) and Furlanetto (2011) set the proportion of rule-of-thumb households to 0.5 in
their baseline calibration, but their analysis find that 0.25 to be a more plausible percentage of rule-of-
thumb households. It is also closer to the predictions of the heterogeneous agents (HANK) literature.
9Carroll (2003), Mankiw et al. (2004) and Nunes (2009) estimate that households update their ex-
pectations (of inflation) around once per year. This translates to sticky information parameters of
households, δ and ω, equal to 0.25.
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realise the shock has happened. This allows Keynesian multiplier-like effects to take
place. As output rises after the expansionary shock, labour demand increases. This
simultaneously increases hours worked and real wages of both households, including
the rule-of-thumb households. This raises their labour income which mechanically
increases their consumption. The boost in consumption also leads to an increase in
aggregate demand, which further stimulates labour demand, and thus the Keynesian
multiplier effects take hold.
Relating the results here to the empirical results of the previous chapter, the model
manages to capture most of the key results in aggregate behaviour. Firstly, aggregate
consumption in Figure 3.1 has different signs depending on the degree of information
frictions, at least for the first few quarters. When information frictions are severe, con-
sumption in aggregate behaves like a rule-of-thumb household — in that, it increases
to a rise in government spending. On the other hand, when agents frequently update,
the household sector as a whole behaves like those in standard neoclassical models.
When the model is calibrated to 1-year inattentiveness (δ = ω = λ = 0.25), as ex-
pected, the results mainly lie between the 2-years and 1.5-quarter calibrations. Given
that the 1-year calibration is similar to the MR07 estimated posterior means, with
the exception of more flexible prices in MR07 (1.5 quarters average price duration), it
is interesting to compare the two calibrations to examine the role of price rigidities
in the model. The most obvious difference lies in the inflation response in Figure
3.3, with inflation rising significantly more under the MR07 calibration. This leads
to a monetary policy response that raises the real interest rate by more, and via the
consumption Euler equation, Ricardian households consumption also falls farther (at
least, in the short term). In addition, the higher inflation in MR07 calibration leads
to lower real wages (of both households). This reduces the real labour income of
households, reducing the rule-of-thumb households consumption.
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Figure 3.1. Impulse Responses of Output and Consumption with Varying Degree of
Inattentiveness
Note: Responses to a 1% government spending shock. The blue lines show the responses when δ =
ω = λ = 0.125 (indicating agents update infrequently, every 2 years), the red lines when δ = ω = λ =
0.25 (updating every 1 year), and yellow lines when δ = ω = λ = 0.65 (updating every 1.5 quarters).
The dashed lines correspond to the MR07 calibration: δ = 0.176, ω = 0.21 and λ = 0.657.
Figure 3.2. Impulse Responses of Labour Market Variables with Varying Degree of
Inattentiveness
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Figure 3.3. Impulse Responses of Other Key Variables with Varying Degree of Inattentiveness
Note: Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 show the responses to a 1% government spending shock. The blue
lines show the responses when δ = ω = λ = 0.125 (indicating agents update infrequently, every 2
years), the red line when δ = ω = λ = 0.25 (updating every 1 year), and the yellow lines when
δ = ω = λ = 0.65 (updating every 1.5 quarters). The dashed lines correspond to the MR07 calibration:
δ = 0.176, ω = 0.21 and λ = 0.657.
Furthermore, the role of information rigidities on labour supply is also apparent in
helping produce a positive consumption co-movement with a government spending
shock. Figure 3.2 shows that hours worked of both types of households rise but real
wages only rise on impact for the rule-of-thumb households. This could be explained
by the following. Labour demand increases for both types of workers, but there is a
much larger shift in labour supply of the Ricardian households via a wealth effect,
leading to a fall in their real wages. This effect is reduced when the workers pay less
attention, for example, in the 2 years calibration.
There is also a spillover effect from the Ricardian real wages to the rule-of-thumb
households. As the price of Ricardian labour do not fall by as much when agents are
more inattentive, firms do not substitute away from rule-of-thumb labour by as much.
This keeps rule-of-thumb real wages higher, enhancing the boost to their labour in-
come, and therefore consumption.
In order to understand how government spending affect the income of the two
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types of households in this model, I calculate their pre-tax income. From the Ricar-

























α ν−1ν − θC
)]
. Similarly, from the rule-of-thumb
households’ budget constraint we have:
incomer = lrt + w
r
t − pt (3.52)
I plot these equations in Figure 3.4, using the parameters as above, with the sticky
information parameters following the MR07.
Figure 3.4. Impulse Responses of Households’ Income
Note: The figure shows the response of Ricardian (solid line) and rule-of-thumb (dotted line) house-
holds income to a 1% government spending shock. Total household income is defined in Eq (3.51) and
Eq (3.52). The proportion of rule-of-thumb households is χ = 0.25. The sticky information parameters
follow MR07 where δ = 0.176, ω = 0.21 and λ = 0.657.
Figure 3.4 shows that an increase in government spending is able to raise the total
income of rule-of-thumb households more — around three-fold that of optimising
households. However, the increase in labour income across the two household types
is exactly the same. This is a consequence of the Cobb-Douglas production function
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of the labour packer, which allocates an equal expenditure for each component. The
difference in total income can be explained by the saving behaviour of the Ricardian
households. That is, they save and invest into government bonds which in turn fi-
nances the rise in government spending.
This also relates to the finding of Galí et al. (2007) that labour market frictions are
important in gaining a positive consumption response to an increase in government
spending. In fact, they only manage to get a positive consumption response in the
model with a labour union, which effectively creates rigidities in wage-setting. Here
the frictions in the labour market is microfounded through information frictions.
3.3.1 Sensitivity Analysis
So far, I only had a blunt instrument in analysing how information frictions affect the
consumption response to a government spending shock, as I varied all sticky informa-
tion parameters at the same time. In this subsection, I dissect the contribution of each
of the sticky information parameters, as well as the role of rule-of-thumb households,
in driving how aggregate consumption responds. To do this, I analyse the contempo-
raneous response of output and consumption (normalised by steady state output) to
a positive government spending shock, as a function of various information stickiness
and fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers specific to each figure in this subsection.10
The remaining parameters are kept at their baseline values, and where the sticky in-
formation parameters are not varied, it follows MR07. The size of the shock is 1% of
steady state output, such that the plotted values of these figures can be interpreted as
impact multipliers. Moreover, I also show the impact responses of the real wage to
further understand the responses of the rule-of-thumb and Ricardian households.
To recap, varying δ (forward-lookingness of consumers) could affect the consump-
tion multiplier as it determines the proportion of consumers that respond to the
crowding-out effects of the government spending shocks. ω (forward-lookingness of
wage-setters) also influence the consumption multiplier by influencing the rigidities
in the labour market and the associated wealth effect of labour supply that the pre-
vious section discussed. λ (price-stickiness of firms) contributes to the consumption
multiplier as more rigid prices lead to a smaller inflation response to the government
10Galí et al. (2007) also have a similar exercise where they focus on the impact multiplier.
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spending shock, and thus a smaller monetary policy response such that consumption
of Ricardian households fall by less (as according to the consumption Euler equation).
Lastly, χ (the proportion of the rule-of-thumb households) changes the extent of the
Keynesian multiplier effects that produces a positive consumption multiplier, which
typically eludes neoclassical models. Of course, there will be interactions between
these parameters too, which I explore below.
Figure 3.5 shows the impact multiplier of output and consumption as a function
of consumers’ inattentiveness (1 − δ).11 The different lines depict the various level
of workers’ inattentiveness – from very inattentive (1− ω = 0.9) (updating every 10
quarters) to more frequent updating (1−ω = 0.1) (around almost every quarter).
The first result of these charts suggests that both lower δ (that is, more inattentive
consumers) and lower ω (that is, more inattentive workers) contribute to a larger gov-
ernment spending impact multiplier. As the inattentiveness of consumers increases,
the lower the impact multipliers are on output and consumption. Likewise, as the
inattentiveness of workers ω increases, each line is lower in the output and consump-
tion charts. This implies that both the consumer and worker channels are operating
qualitatively. As δ decreases, consumers are less Ricardian in aggregate, and as ω is
lower, the labour supply effect — that Ricardian workers supply more labour upon re-
alising that the shock has happened via a wealth effect — is weaker, and thus supports
the results in consumption and real wage in the previous section.
The second result is that these two channels do not complement one another. This
could be seen by comparing the increase in the output and aggregate consumption
impact multiplier when changing ω when moving across δ (in the left and right of
the charts). The increase in the impact multiplier when lowering ω is larger when δ is
high (when the consumers are close to fully attentive, and thus the consumer channel
is relatively weak). Note that this result is fully driven by Ricardian households’
consumption, as the gap between ω = 0.1 and ω = 0.9 varies with δ only in the
Ricardian consumption and not in the rule-of-thumb consumption. This suggests that
indeed it is an information friction effect that operates.
11For the equivalent figures of real wages and labour, see Figure C.1.
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Figure 3.5. Impact Multipliers of Output and Consumption as a Function of Varying
Inattentiveness of Consumers δ and Workers ω
Note: A value of δ and ω closer to 0 indicate more sticky information.
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The third result is that a quantitative horse-race between the role of δ and ω in
creating a larger government spending multiplier, δ appears to be more important. For
a given ω, as δ is lowered (making consumers more inattentive), the impact multiplier
is larger by 0.3. In contrast, for a given δ, as ω falls from 0.9 to 0.1 (making workers
more inattentive), the impact multiplier only increases by 0.1 on average.
Furthermore, a crucial ingredient of this model is the role of limited asset market
participation (rule-of-thumb households), which was the key insight from Galí et al.
(2007). So, a pertinent question is how does the proportion of rule-of-thumb house-
holds affect the impact multiplier and how it interacts with the consumer and worker
channels.
The first takeaway from Figures 3.6 to 3.8 is, as expected, the larger the proportion
rule-of-thumb households, the higher is the output and aggregate consumption multi-
pliers. This is because the higher χ is the stronger the Keynesian multiplier effects are
through the rule-of-thumb households. Ricardian households’ consumption falls by
more when χ is higher, because of the larger output impact leads to higher inflation,
inducing a stronger monetary policy response to tighten, and thus lower the Ricardian
consumption through the consumption Euler equation. However, this is more than
offset by the larger response of the rule-of-thumb households consumption, leading
to an overall larger aggregate consumption multiplier when χ is higher. Additionally,
the output and consumption charts are negatively sloped as before, indicating that
the consumer and worker channels are more prominent when information rigidities
are stronger, no matter the level of χ.
The second takeaway is that limited asset market participation interacts with
sticky information parameters to create larger impact multipliers. This can be seen in
the figures as the effect of increasing χ is much more pronounced when information
rigidities are severe (for example, when δ = ω = 0.1). This is because when a large
proportion of Ricardian consumers and workers respond to the government spending
shock (i.e. when δ or ω are large), the reduction in Ricardian consumption dampens
the Keynesian multiplier effects from taking hold.
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Figure 3.6. Impact Multipliers of Output and Consumption as a Function of Varying
Inattentiveness of Households and χ the Fraction of Rule-of-Thumb Households
Note: δ and ω closer to 0 indicate more sticky information.
Figure 3.7. Impact Multipliers of Output and Consumption as a Function of Varying
Inattentiveness of Consumers and χ the Fraction of Rule-of-Thumb Households
Note: δ closer to 0 indicate more sticky information.
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Figure 3.8. Impact Multipliers of Output and Consumption as a Function of Varying
Inattentiveness of Workers and χ the Fraction of Rule-of-Thumb Households
Note: ω closer to 0 indicate more sticky information.
Galí et al. (2007) emphasise the role of nominal rigidities in achieving co-movement
between consumption and government spending. This remains the case in the infor-
mation friction setup here. The intuition of why price rigidities help large multipliers
is as follows. If prices are very sticky, inflation does not rise by much in response
to a demand shock. As such, the monetary policy response is relatively muted, and
therefore the Ricardian households consumption does not fall by much. This allows
for an amplification to aggregate consumption via the Keynesian multiplier effects.
This can be seen in Figure 3.9 where I vary the information rigidities on price-
setters to show that as prices become more sticky, the impact multipliers are also
larger. Likewise, in Figure 3.10, reducing price flexibility λ increases the impact mul-
tipliers, and especially so when χ is large. As χ increases, the reduction in Ricardian
consumption is only marginally increased when prices are sticky, but is substantial
when prices are relatively flexible.
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Figure 3.9. Impact Multipliers of Output and Consumption as a Function of Varying
Inattentiveness of Households δ = ω and Firms λ
Note: A value of δ, ω and λ closer to 0 indicate more sticky information.
Figure 3.10. Impact Multipliers of Output and Consumption as a Function of Varying
Inattentiveness Firms and Fraction of Rule-of-Thumb Households
Note: λ closer to 0 indicate more sticky information. χ is the fraction of rule-of-thumb households.
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Previously, it was shown that rigidities in consumers are partially substitutable in
workers in producing a large multiplier. Here, the substitution is much stronger —
the inattentiveness of firms can make up for frequently updating households (δ = ω).
Even when households (both consumers and workers) update very frequently, as
long prices are very rigid, a positive consumption impact multiplier is still feasi-
ble. However, the price rigidities here would imply extremely long price durations,
much longer than what the literature suggests (Bils and Klenow, 2004; Klenow and
Kryvtsov, 2008; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008). The micro evidence shows that price
changes occur between 3 to 9 months, on average. Therefore, in empirically-sensible
calibrations, it is likely that information rigidities in the household sector play an
important role in explaining large government spending multipliers.
3.4 Fiscal Policy Discussions
Much of the discussion in the previous sections revolves around the role of monetary
policy. This is of course not unique to this model – even the textbook IS-LM model
predicts that the monetary policy response affect the equilibrium outcome of govern-
ment spending. However, it should be emphasised that while the real interest rate is
mostly determined by the Taylor rule (the central bank sets the nominal rate but does
not pin down expected inflation), it still plays a crucial role in the clearing of the bond
market. If the government increases spending but does not raise sufficient taxes, it
has to issue government bonds. In the model, the Ricardian households are the sole
buyers of government bonds. Therefore, the real interest rate must rise to incentivise
these households to save. This operates through the consumption Euler equation that
reduces consumption, and thus increases the demand for government bonds.
In this paper, I focus exclusively on lump-sum taxes. This is an important first
step as it allows us to cleanly examine the role of information frictions, which will be
more difficult under distortionary taxes. The reason is, combined with the fiscal rule
specification that the path of government spending, taxes and public debt are exactly
the same no matter the degree of information frictions, as shown in Figure 3.3. This
implies that the fiscal stimulus over time from the 1% government spending shock
are identical across the different calibrations. In addition, this implicit assumption
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is somewhat supported by the empirical results in Chapter 2, where I show that the
path of a government spending shock is very similar in the high and low information
frictions regimes (alongside the linear estimates too).
3.5 Conclusion
There is little agreement in the literature on how consumption responds to govern-
ment spending shocks. In Chapter 2, I empirically reconciled the Keynesian and
neoclassical predictions on the contrasting response of private consumption to a gov-
ernment spending shock, by emphasising the importance of information frictions.
Here, I provide a quantitative framework on how information frictions could affect
consumption response to a government spending shock, and thus the associated fiscal
multipliers.
I use a standard sticky information general equilibrium model á la (Mankiw and
Reis, 2007) with the addition of rule-of-thumb households á la Galí et al. (2007). In this
setup, only a fraction of the households (optimising households) in the economy up-
date their information about the state of the economy that period. This friction creates
nominal and real rigidities as agents update to shocks with a lag. The rule-of-thumb
households fully consume their current after-tax labour income. These households
differ from the optimising households (those who update their consumption plan
sporadically) as they cannot smooth consumption through bond holdings.
When there are many optimising households who save in advance of higher future
taxes, consumption falls in line with neoclassical effects and in line with empirical re-
sults in Chapter 2 under low information rigidities. On the other hand, when agents
are highly inattentive and that the proportion of rule-of-thumb households is suffi-
ciently high, the effects of the Ricardian households are relatively muted. This allows
for aggregate consumption to rise, as Keynesian multiplier-like effects take place, as
with the empirical results under significant information frictions.
Furthermore, I examine the contribution of each of the sticky information param-
eters in the model, as well as the role of the rule-of-thumb households, in producing
the overall behaviour of aggregate consumption. I find that all three forms of infor-
mation frictions contribute to producing the heterogeneity in consumption responses,
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but that the information friction on consumers has the largest effect on consumption
behaviour.
A key takeaway from this paper is that all considered forms of information fric-
tions – consumers, labour supply and price-setting – contribute to a more posi-
tive/less negative consumption multiplier, but that the information frictions on con-
sumers seem to be the most important among the three. In this paper, I focus ex-
clusively on lump-sum taxes and government spending shocks for important reasons
described in the previous section. Future work that includes distortionary taxes could
provide insights how various fiscal policy instruments interact with information fric-
tions in two dimensions. Firstly, when distortionary taxes are used instead of lump-
sum taxes to repay public debt. Secondly, distortionary taxes open new fiscal policy
instruments for a government to achieve their objectives.
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Appendix A
Real and Nominal Effects of Monetary
Shocks under Time-Varying
Disagreement
A.1 Rational Inattention Model Details
Optimal price setting decision:
pit = E [p∗it | sit, Ii,t−1] = ϕE
[
yt | syit, Ii,t−1
]
− E [ait | sait, Ii,t−1] (A.1)
Information constraint:
I (p∗it; sit | Ii,t−1) = H (p∗it | Ii,t−1)− H (p∗it | sit, Ii,t−1) ≤ K (A.2)





log2 [2πeVar (X)] (A.3)
H (X | I) = 1
2
log2 [2πeVar (X | I)] (A.4)
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So:
H (yt | Ii,t−1)− H
(
yt | syit, Ii,t−1
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Kyit
+ H (ait | Ii,t−1)− H (ait | sait, Ii,t−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Kait
≤ K (A.5)
Taking the profit maximising price and signals (where the noises of the signals
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Based on the previous equation, an attention allocation implies the following per-














A.1.1 Optimal Pricing Rule and Attention allocation
For a given attention choice, Kalman filtering equation, pricing rule, and the noise
volatility above, the optimal price setting decision is
pit = E [p∗it | sit, Ii,t−1]
= ϕE
[
yt | syit, Ii,t−1
]








































































































































































it σ2b + 2
−2Kait σ2a (A.20)
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it σ2b + 2 ln(2)2
−2(K−Ky∗it )σ2a = 0 (A.22)
ϕ22−2K
y∗
it σ2b = 2
−2(K−Ky∗it )σ2a (A.23)
taking log(2) of everything:
−2Ky∗it + log2(ϕ
2σ2b ) = −2Kit + 2K
y∗





























A.1.2 Comparative Statics: Disagreement











































































































































































































































syit = yt + ε
y



















(−c) < 0 (A.29)
Which means that as r ↑, pit ↓
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2−K ϕc < 0 (A.32)
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A.2 GIRF Bootstrap Algorithm
I follow the algorithm in Koop et al. (1996):
1. Pick a history and Ωt−1 contains the sequence of lagged data up to time t− 1,
which defines the history of the model at date t. Also, pick a structural shock of
size δ.
2. Use Monte-Carlo integration to compute the conditional response for: variable y,
shock size δ, history Ωt−1 and horizon h = 0, 1, . . . , H
3. Then average out over each regime’s set of random histories Ωr, to get the un-
conditional responses for each regime
4. Subtract the second from first time path. The difference is the estimate of GIRF.
5. However, Step 4 is a noisy estimate. To eliminate the random variation in the
GIRF, repeat steps 2 - 4 many times and take the mean of the resulting impulse
responses as the central tendency. I also take the empirical quantiles from these
draws to compute the confidence intervals.
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A.3 Robustness
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Real GDP 1−year Ahead Disagreement
Figure A.1. Time-Varying Disagreement: Real GDP Forecasts: 2- and 4-Quarter Ahead
Note: Time series of the real GDP disagreement index based on the dispersion (interquartile range) of
SPF 2-quarter ahead and 1-year (4 quarters) ahead forecasts. The grey shaded areas indicate NBER-
dated recessions. The red shaded areas indicate high disagreement periods. The red line indicate the
estimated threshold. The sample period is 1970Q1-2018Q4.
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Figure A.2. Threshold VAR Generalised Impulse Responses: 2-quarter Ahead
Note: The shock corresponds to a positive one standard deviation change in the FFR. The GIRFs are
generated with 68% bootstrapped confidence intervals using threshold VAR with a lag of 4 quarters.
The threshold is estimated using SPF disagreement of the 2-quarter ahead of real GDP. Red lines
(dashed) indicate high disagreement period and blue lines (solid) indicate low disagreement period.




























































Figure A.3. Threshold VAR Generalised Impulse Responses: 1-year Ahead
The shock corresponds to a positive one standard deviation change in the FFR. The GIRFs are gener-
ated with 68% bootstrapped confidence intervals using threshold VAR with a lag of 4 quarters. The
threshold is estimated using SPF disagreement of the 1-year ahead of real GDP. Red lines (dashed) in-
dicate high disagreement period and blue lines (solid) indicate low disagreement period. The sample
period is 1970Q1-2018Q4.
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Figure A.4. Threshold VAR Generalised Impulse Responses: Pre-GFC
The shock corresponds to a positive one standard deviation change in the FFR. The GIRFs are gener-
ated with 68% bootstrapped confidence intervals using threshold VAR with a lag of 3 quarters. The
threshold is estimated using SPF disagreement of the nowcasts of real GDP. Red lines (dashed) indicate
high disagreement period and blue lines (solid) indicate low disagreement period.The sample period
is 1970Q1-2007Q4.
A.3.4 Smooth Transition Local Projections
The reasons to use a dummy variable in the local projections in the main section is
to allow for the nature of the disagreement variables that may change each period,
that is also consistent with the threshold VAR. But, I show here that using the smooth
transition local projections — which has been utilised in the literature to estimate
the effects monetary and fiscal policy shocks in recession and expansion periods —
the main results also hold. Figure A.5 plots the narrative shock series, but for the
non-linearly narratively identified monetary policy shocks, I use a smooth-transition
method of regimes-switching.
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Figure A.5. Smooth Transition Local Projections Narrative Monetary Shocks
I extend the narrative monetary shocks of Romer and Romer (2004) up to 2013Q4. The top figure
shows the RR original shocks (black line), the extended linear narrative shock (blue line), and the
extended non-linear narrative shocks (green line). I use smooth-transition to identify the disagreement
regimes for the non-linearly narratively identified monetary shocks. The bottom figure shows how
the narrative approach with shadow rates neatly captures unexpected movements in unconventional
monetary policies since the financial crisis.
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As in Section 1.6, I estimate a set of regressions for each horizon h as follows
xt+h = F(zt−1)[αA,h + ψA,h(L)Xt−1 + βA,hshockt]
+ (1− F(zt−1))[αB,h + ψB,h(L)Xt−1 + βB,hshockt] + εt+h
Instead here, F(zt) is a smooth increasing function of an indicator of the state of the
economy zt. Following Granger and Terasvirta (1993) and Tenreyro and Thwaites














where c is a parameter that controls what proportion of the sample the economy
spends in either state and σz is the standard deviation of the state variable F(zt).
The parameter θ determines how violently the economy switches from high to low
disagreement when zt changes. Higher values of θ mean that F(zt) spends more time
close to the 0, 1 bounds of the process, moving the model closer to a discrete regime-
switching setup. Smaller values of θ mean that more of the observations are taken
to contain some information about behaviour in both high and low disagreement
regimes. I calibrate the parameter value to θ = 3, as in Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016),
to give an intermediate degree of intensity to the regime switching.
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Figure A.6. Smooth Transition Local Projections Impulse Responses
The first and second column shows the response of real output and prices to a 1% narrative monetary
shock, respectively. The first and second rows show the responses under high and low disagreement
periods, respectively. The shaded area is the 68% confidence interval. The sample period is 1970Q1-
2018Q4.
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Nominal GDP Nominal GNP Real GDP Real GNP
Figure A.7. GNP and GDP 4-Quarter Growth
The figure shows the percent change from a year ago of GPD and GNP. The red line depicts Nominal
GDP and the blue line depicts the Real GDP. The green line depicts Nominal GNP and the purple line
depicts the Real GNP. The sample period is 1970Q1-2018Q4.
123
Appendix B
Reconciling the Effects of Government
Spending: The Role of Information
Frictions
B.1 Survey of Professional Forecasters: GNP and GDP
Nowcast
As an additional robustness check, I investigate another possible structural breaks in
the collection of the surveys. I conduct the same analysis as the baseline exercise but
restricting the sample period I use here to (a) 1970Q1-1991Q4 and (b) 1992Q1-2018Q4.
I keep the same definition of state as in the main analysis: disagreement (IQR) of the
real GDP nowcasts. An important point to note here is that even though the threshold
is still at the median of the disagreement time series, there is much less variation in
the disagreement series between 1992 and 2018. Thus, when comparing the high and
low disagreement regime, we are in effect comparing ‘low’ and ‘lower’ disagreement
regime, respectively. Similarly there when comparing the regimes between 1970 and
1991, it would be comparing ‘high’ and ‘higher’ disagreement regimes. Moreover, the
baseline disagreement series shows that the moderation of disagreement starts earlier
than 1992Q1. This is more in line with ‘Placebo1’ in the Placebo tests, a period around
the Great Moderation period in the mid-1980s.
For this analysis, it is perhaps worth noting again the history of the Survey of
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Professional Forecasters. Since 1992, forecasters were asked forecasts of GDP instead
of GNP in the previous years.1 If GDP was more predictable and/or less volatile
than GNP, then that would naturally create lower disagreement across forecasters.
However, as GNP tracks GDP extraordinarily closely, it eliminates the possibility that
the change (lessening) in disagreement is due to forecasters finding it easier to forecast
GDP than GNP.
In Figure B.1, some of the output responses may not be very intuitive. However,
examining the components of output (government spending, consumption and in-
vestment) is more insightful. The responses of the macroeconomic variables during
1992 to 2018 approximately coincide with the baseline results. The response of con-
sumption is qualitatively the same as the baseline results, only that it takes more time
for consumption to rise under the high disagreement regime. This could be because
the ‘high’ disagreement regime in this restricted sample only indicates marginally high
levels of information frictions, but still low levels in absolute terms.
Furthermore, investment also behaves qualitatively similar as the baseline results.
The minor difference is the magnitudes of the responses: under low disagreement,
consumption and investment falls by twice as much as the baseline results. This
strength in the consumption and investment response is sufficient to cancel out the
rise in government spending itself, explaining why output falls. It is worth repeating
the point that the variation in disagreement in this restricted sample is very limited.
Indeed, one of the main reason why Ramey and Zubairy (2018) extend their sample
to the 19th century is to gain sufficient number of slack and non-slack states to get
enough variation. Thus, it is not a surprise that magnitudes of the results here differ
to the baseline sample, but nevertheless, it supports the main analysis as the key
results hold qualitatively.
1The SPF began in 1968 and was conducted by the American Statistical Association and the Na-
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Figure B.1. Impulse Responses to a 1% Government Spending Shock: GNP and GDP
Note: The first column shows the responses from when forecasters were asked to forecast GNP (sample
period: 1970Q1-1991Q4) and the second column shows when they forecasted GDP (sample period:
1992Q1-2018Q4). The threshold is real GDP Nowcast (IQR normalised with median) disagreement.
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Sample Period: 1970Q1-1991Q4
1-quarter 1-year 2-year 3-year 4-year 5-year
Output
Linear 0.12 0.04 0.14 0.18 0.25 0.37
High Disagreement -0.04 0.17 0.56 0.34 0.35 0.55
Low Disagreement 0.39 0.33 0.14 0.15 0.27 0.50
Consumption
Linear 0.02 0.11 0.24 0.34 0.50 0.64
High Disagreement -0.20 0.00 0.01 -0.10 0.09 0.24
Low Disagreement 0.16 0.04 0.05 0.24 0.51 0.76
Investment
Linear -0.06 -0.87 -1.33 -1.64 -1.94 -2.13
High Disagreement -0.83 -1.86 -1.31 -1.27 -1.48 -1.27
Low Disagreement 0.83 0.81 -0.06 -0.80 -1.06 -1.05
Sample Period: 1992Q1-2018Q4
1-quarter 1-year 2-year 3-year 4-year 5-year
Output
Linear 0.41 0.36 0.26 0.21 0.10 0.01
High Disagreement 0.52 0.49 0.52 0.61 0.58 0.47
Low Disagreement 0.28 0.16 -0.32 -0.61 -0.75 -0.84
Consumption
Linear 0.10 0.10 0.03 -0.05 -0.16 -0.26
High Disagreement 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.04 -0.06
Low Disagreement 0.03 -0.12 -0.64 -1.09 -1.44 -2.10
Investment
Linear 0.63 1.00 0.90 0.62 0.34 0.04
High Disagreement 0.78 0.89 1.10 1.15 0.89 0.42
Low Disagreement 0.52 1.29 0.67 -0.26 -0.56 -0.35
Note: These are the cumulative multipliers defined as Mxh =
∑hi=0 xh
∑hi=0 gh
where xh is the dollar effect on
variable x of a one dollar increase in government spending at h quarters after the shock.
Table B.1. Estimates of Multipliers using Forecast of GNP and GDP
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Government Consumption Government Investment Government Spending Transfer Payment
Figure B.2. Nominal Government Spending and Transfer Payment Time Series
Note: The proportion of nominal government consumption (blue bars) and investment (yellow bars)














Government Consumption Government Investment Government Spending Transfer Payment
Figure B.3. Government Spending and Transfer Payment in Log Dollars
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B.2.1 Alternative Measurements of Disagreement
The third robustness check is to look at various alternative ways to measure disagree-
ment, as follows:
Quasi IQR : The first alternative is, instead of using the interquartile range 25th− 75th, I use
a range between 16th and 84th percentile.2
IQR SD : The second (IQR SD) and third (IQR Winsor SD) alternative is to treat the
outlier using statistical treatment. In this case, the outliers are data point that
lower than 25th percentile + 1.5 ∗ IQR and higher than 75th percentile + 1.5 ∗ IQR.
The difference between the second and third alternative is the way I treat the
outliers: either I simply drop the outliers, or in the latter alternative, I winsorise
the outliers (instead of dropping the data, I replace outliers lower than the 25th
percentile to the value of the 25th percentile, and likewise with outliers above
the 75th percentile).
Outlier SD : The fourth (Outlier SD) and fifth alternative (Outlier Winsor SD) is to treat the
outlier using statistical treatment where observations beyond the median value ±
3σ are outliers. The difference between the two alternatives is as above.
SD : The last alternative is to simply take the standard deviation from the whole
sample period.
2This allows for a more lenient outlier treatment. Giordani and Söderlind (2003), Boero et al. (2015),
and Grimme et al. (2014) have used quasi standard deviation to treat their survey data. The idea is that
for a normal distribution, this interval is equal to the mean ± 1 standard deviation. Since I do not use











Real GDP Nowcast Dispersion (Quasi SD)
Figure B.4. Alternative Measurement of Disagreement: Quasi SD
Note: Time series of the disagreement index based on the range between 84th and 16th percentile
normalised with median of Survey of Professional Forecasters real GDP nowcast. The red shaded










Real GDP Nowcast Dispersion (IQR Fence SD)
Figure B.5. Alternative Measurement of Disagreement: IQR Fence SD
Note: Time series of the disagreement index based on the standard deviation of Survey of Professional
Forecasters real GDP nowcast after the outlier treatment of trimming observations outside of a ‘fence’










Real GDP Nowcast Dispersion (IQR Winsor SD)
Figure B.6. Alternative Measurement of Disagreement: IQR Winsor SD
Note: Time series of the disagreement index based on the standard deviation of Survey of Professional
Forecasters real GDP nowcast after the outlier treatment of winsorising variables outside of a ‘fence’













Real GDP Nowcast Dispersion (Outlier Treatment SD)
Figure B.7. Alternative Measurement of Disagreement: Outlier Treatment SD
Note: Time series of the disagreement index based on the standard deviation (after an outlier treatment
by trimming the observations beyond the median value ± 3σ normalised with the median) of the of











Real GDP Nowcast Dispersion (Outlier Treatment Winsor)
Figure B.8. Alternative Measurement of Disagreement: Outlier Treatment Winsor
Note: Time series of the disagreement index based on the standard deviation (after an outlier treatment
by winsorising the observations beyond the median value ± 3σ normalised with the median) of the of











Real GDP Nowcast Dispersion (Standard Deviation)
Figure B.9. Alternative Measurement of Disagreement: Standard Deviation
Note: Time series of the disagreement index based on the standard deviation of Survey of Professional
Forecasters real GDP nowcast.
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Table B.10 compares the impulse responses of high and low disagreement regimes,
for alternative disagreement measures as described above. As in the main result,
government spending responses under the two regimes are statistically different. This
is reassuring that government spending do not respond differently whether firms and
households are in the low or high information frictions, echoing the main results that
government spending is not affected by household or firms’ expectations formation.
It also makes comparisons of the two states easier.
The response of output corresponds to main result where it is persistently above
zero in high disagreement regime, and that this is statistically different to responses
under low disagreement regime – where response of output is initially positive and
then dips towards zero and can become negative. There is only one disagreement
measure that do not reproduce the main result: the pure standard deviation. The re-
sponses in the two regimes are not statistically different in the two regimes, because
even under low disagreement, output has mostly positive response. But with surveys,
it is very important to treat for outliers. Using measures of standard deviation with ei-
ther trimming or winsorising, I arrive at the same results as the baseline disagreement
measure.
The response of consumption is in general consistent with the main findings: (1) in
high information friction regime, households might become non-Ricardian and (2) the
responses between the two regimes are different — in low information frictions, con-
sumers expect that higher future taxes to finance the increase in government spending.
But again, with the exception of the standard deviation disagreement measure where
in low disagreement regime, the response of consumption is very weakly negative.
Lastly, the response of investment across the various alternative disagreement
measures is also broadly consistent with the baseline results. The minor differences
occur at the longer horizons with some measures, where under low disagreement
investment is not statistically significant from zero (in the baseline, there is some
crowding out of private investment). The responses under high disagreement periods
is qualitatively the same as the baseline result for all of the alternative measures.
Table B.2 displays the estimates of the government spending multipliers for the
alternative disagreement measures. As Figure B.10 show closely similar impulse re-
sponses, I show the multipliers for three of the alternative measures.
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Disagreement: Quasi IQR
1-quarter 1-year 2-year 3-year 4-year 5-year
Output
High Disagreement 1.03 0.66 0.74 0.67 0.84 0.91
Low Disagreement 2.15 2.30 2.25 2.06 1.34 0.71
Consumption
High Disagreement 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.15 0.18
Low Disagreement 0.69 0.92 1.06 0.90 0.50 0.00
Investment
High Disagreement 0.17 -0.01 -0.08 -0.17 -0.23 -0.26
Low Disagreement 0.28 0.60 0.65 0.52 0.28 -0.01
Disagreement: Outlier Treatment SD
1-quarter 1-year 2-year 3-year 4-year 5-year
Output
High Disagreement 1.34 1.36 1.70 1.66 1.76 1.79
Low Disagreement 1.54 1.04 0.44 0.30 0.15 0.01
Consumption
High Disagreement 0.09 0.25 0.43 0.53 0.76 0.82
Low Disagreement 0.35 0.18 -0.16 -0.47 -0.79 -1.14
Investment
High Disagreement 0.12 -0.11 -0.17 -0.25 -0.31 -0.32
Low Disagreement 0.13 0.21 0.13 0.04 -0.06 -0.16
Disagreement: Standard Deviation
1-quarter 1-year 2-year 3-year 4-year 5-year
Output
High Disagreement 1.16 0.93 0.99 0.89 0.93 0.90
Low Disagreement 1.90 1.78 1.48 1.46 0.84 0.24
Consumption
High Disagreement -0.02 0.04 0.10 0.12 0.21 0.18
Low Disagreement 0.47 0.50 0.21 -0.12 -0.86 -1.67
Investment
High Disagreement 0.11 -0.10 -0.25 -0.42 -0.53 -0.62
Low Disagreement 0.11 0.26 0.29 0.28 0.12 -0.12
Note: These are the cumulative multipliers defined as Mxh =
∑hi=0 xh
∑hi=0 gh
where xh is the dollar effect on
variable x of a one dollar increase in government spending at h quarters after the shock.
Table B.2. Estimates of Multipliers with Alternative Disagreement Measures
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Quarters
Figure B.10. Impulse Responses to a 1% Government Spending Shock using Alternative Disagreement Measures
Note: The row shows responses of output, government spending, consumption and investment, respectively, to a 1% government spending shock. Government
spending is the (real) government consumption expenditure and gross investment in Ramey and Zubairy (2018) dataset. The columns show the various ways
to measure disagreement. The sample period is 1970Q1-2018Q4.
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Appendix C
Sticky Information and the Effects of
Government Spending Shocks
C.1 Attentive Agents
In the sticky information model setup (Mankiw and Reis, 2007; Reis, 2009), some
agents in the economy are attentive – they do not face any information frictions prob-
lems. These attentive agents are the consumer’s shoppers of the households who
purchase goods from the goods market, and the hiring department of a firm j de-
mands workers Lt,j from the labour packer (see Section C.1.1) and pays the labour
packer the aggregate wage Wt. Note that these agents are different to the agents who
are inattentive (face information frictions) – the consumer’s saver-planner and worker
in the households, and price-setter in the firms.














0 Pt,iCt,j(i) < PtCt,j.
Pt,i is the price of each variety of good i, and the consumer values them according
to a Dixit-Stiglitz utility function, with a stochastic elasticity of substitution νt. The

























The labour packer receives a supply of differentiated labour input from the optimising
and rule-of-thumb households. They bundle the differentiated labour from Ricardian
households (which each supply a labour variety i) with a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator that

















This creates labour supply Lot , which then combined with L
r
t (from the rule-of-thumb
households) by another Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator. I assume that the elasticity substitu-
tion is 1, resulting in a Cobb-Douglas production function. This simplifying assump-
tion allows greater tractibility so that we can keep the Galí et al. (2007) assumption
that steady-state labour L = Lo = Lr.




where χ + (1− χ) = 1.
The labour packer maximises
max
{Lt,k(i)}i∈[0,1]






























Lt : Wt − λt = 0
Lot : −Wot + λt(Lot )−
1
σ (1− χ) 1σ
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lot = −σ(wot − wt) + lt






(1− χ)(1− σ)(Wo)−σ 1
1− σ
[
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1− σ
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(1− χ)(Wo)1−σWσwot + χ(Wr)−σWσwrt
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C.2 Sticky Information Phillips Curve – Firms
Consider the maximisation problem faced by the pricing department of a firm that
last updated its information j periods ago. In each period, a randomly drawn fraction
of firms λ updates their information, so there are λ(1− λ)j firms in this situation. The













subject to its production function
Yt,j = AtLαt,j (C.2)





























































+ Et−jλ1αAtLα−1t,j = 0 (C.6)



























































































= Et−j(νt − 1)
Yt,j
Pt















pt,j = pt +
α(wt − pt) + (1− α)yt − at − α ν̂tν−1
α + ν(1− α) (C.8)
C.3 Sticky Information IS Curve – Consumers
Here we consider the problem of an inattentive consumer. For simplicity, I drop the
‘o’ notation, for example, Ct here is actually Cot . If she updates her plan at date t, she
chooses a plan for current and future consumption to solve:
V(Bt) = max
Ct+i,i













subject to her budget contraint
Bt+1+i = Πt+1+i
(




for i = 0, 1, ... (C.10)
and a no-Ponzi scheme condition. V(.) is the value function of the agent that depends
on her wealth Bt with a δ is the probability at each date t that the consumer updates
her plan. β is the discount factor and θ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
so preferences are iso-elastic. Notice that preferences are also additively separable in
consumption and leisure, but since the consumer does not control labor supply, the
term in leisure drops out of her problem. The budget constraint assumes that wages
are received at the beginning of the period so they earn interest Πt (which is equal to
the real return of government bonds Rt) before the next period. Finally Tt denote both
lump-sum taxes as well as the payments from an insurance contract that all agents
sign at the beginning of time that ensures that they all have the same wealth at the
start of each period. This is a standard assumption in these models to avoid tracking


























Πz+1 the compound return between t+ i and t+ 1+ k.





Eq (C.12) recursively and using these results, we get the first result in Eq (C.13).
Equation (C.13) is the standard Euler equation for a well-informed agent, who update
their information in the current period. It reads that the marginal utility of consuming
today is equal to the expected discounted marginal utility of consuming tomorrow
times the return on savings. Condition Eq (C.11) for i = j and Eq (C.12) for date t + j
imply our second result in Eq (C.14). Equation (C.14) notes that agents who are not
very well informed (those who do not update in the current period) set their marginal
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For interested readers, I elaborate the steps to obtain these optimality conditions
of the consumer’s plan in the following subsection.
Derivations in detail
Getting the first result (Euler equation). The first optimality condition, Eq (C.11), is
the first-order condition from the value function of Eq (C.9). The next step is to take



















Bt+1 = Πt+1 (Bt − Ct,i + . . . )
Bt+2 = Πt+2 (Bt+1 − Ct+1,i + . . . )
Bt+2 = Πt+2 (Πt+1 (Bt − Ct,i + . . . )− Ct+1,i + . . . )


































+ . . .
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Multiply both sides of V′(Bt+1) with β(1− δ)Πt+1









+ . . .
By the Law of Iterative Expectations: Et[Et+1Xt+2] = Et[Xt+2] i.e. today’s expectations
of tomorrow’s expectations of a day after variable is equal to today’s expectations of
day after variable.
Thus, when we multiply both sides with Et, we get









+ . . .
and we can see that the RHS of the above equation correspond the second terms




























and we also get that C−1/θt+1,0 = V
′(Bt+1). Then, writing Eq (C.12) recursively and using












where Πt+1 = Rt+1 as it is only for one period.
Getting the second result. To re-cap, let’s note the equations we need to get to second








































+ . . .
Note: Π̄t+j,t+j+1 = Πt+j+1 and Π̄t+j,t+j+2 = Πt+j+1Πt+j+2 so,
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(C.18)
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(C.19)





























C.4 Sticky Information Wage Curve – Labours
Here we consider the problem of an inattentive worker from the optimising house-
holds, who solve a similar problem to optimising consumers in the previous section.


















subject to the budget constraint (that is identical to the consumer’s)
Bt+1+i = Πt+1+i
(















where V̂(.) is the value function perceived by the worker with ω as the probability at
each date t that the worker updates her information. β is the discount factor and ψ is
the Frisch elasticity of labour supply in the iso-elastic utility function.










































































































Taking Eq (C.25) recursively
V̂′(Bt) = βωEtV̂′(Bt+1)Πt+1+
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βωβ(1−ω)EtV̂′(Bt+2)Πt+1Πt+2 + . . .
V̂′(Bt+1) = βωEt+1V̂′(Bt+2)Πt+2 + . . .
β(1−ω)EtV̂′(Bt+1)Πt+1 = βωβ(1−ω)Et+1V̂′(Bt+2)Πt+1Πt+2 + . . .
V̂′(Bt) = βωEtV̂′(Bt+1)Πt+1 + β(1−ω)EtV̂′(Bt+1)Πt+1
= EtV̂′(Bt+1)Πt+1 [βω + β− βω]
= βEtV̂′(Bt+1)Πt+1













































To define Wt+i,i we set Eq (C.24) for i = j and Eq (C.25) for date t + j. Setting Eq




























+ . . .
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+ . . .
We can see that the RHS of the above equation is part of the RHS of Eq (C.24) (and























































C.5 Sensitivity Analysis: Responses of Wage and Labour
Figure C.1. Response of Wage as a Function of Varying Inattentiveness of Consumers δ and
Workers ω
Note: A value of δ and ω closer to 0 indicate more sticky information.
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Figure C.2. Response of Wage as a Function of Varying Inattentiveness of Households and χ
the Fraction of Rule-of-Thumb Households
Note: δ and ω closer to 0 indicate more sticky information.
Figure C.3. Response of Wage as a Function of Varying Inattentiveness of Consumers and χ
the Fraction of Rule-of-Thumb Households
Note: δ closer to 0 indicate more sticky information.
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Figure C.4. Response of Wage as a Function of Varying Inattentiveness of Workers and χ the
Fraction of Rule-of-Thumb Households
Note: ω closer to 0 indicate more sticky information.
Figure C.5. Response of Wage as a Function of Varying Inattentiveness of Households δ = ω
and Firms λ
Note: A value of δ, ω and λ closer to 0 indicate more sticky information.
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Figure C.6. Response of Wage as a Function of Varying Inattentiveness Firms and Fraction of
Rule-of-Thumb Households
Note: λ closer to 0 indicate more sticky information. χ is the fraction of rule-of-thumb households.
152
Bibliography
Aastveit, K. A., Natvik, G. J., and Sola, S. (2017). Economic Uncertainty and the
Influence of Monetary Policy. Journal of International Money and Finance, 76:50–67.
Alloza, M. (2017). Is Fiscal Policy More Effective in Uncertain Times or During Reces-
sions? Banco de Espana Working Paper No. 1730.
Andrade, P., Crump, R. K., Eusepi, S., and Moench, E. (2016). Fundamental Disagree-
ment. Journal of Monetary Economics, 83:106–128.
Andrade, P. and Le Bihan, H. (2013). Inattentive Professional Forecasters. Journal of
Monetary Economics, 60(8):967–982.
Auerbach, A. J. and Gorodnichenko, Y. (2012). Measuring the Output Responses to
Fiscal Policy. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 4(2):1–27.
Auerbach, A. J. and Gorodnichenko, Y. (2013). Fiscal Multipliers in Recession and
Expansion. Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis, page 63.
Baker, S. R., Bloom, N., and Davis, S. J. (2016). Measuring Economic Policy Uncer-
tainty. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131(4):1593–1636.
Basu, S. and Kimball, M. (2003). Investment Planning Costs and the Effects of Fiscal
and Monetary Policy. University of Michigan manuscript.
Bernanke, B. S. (2020). The New Tools of Monetary Policy. American Economic Review,
110(4):943–83.
Bernanke, B. S. and Gertler, M. (1995). Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of
Monetary Policy Transmission. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(4):27–48.
153
Bilbiie, F. O. (2011). Nonseparable Preferences, Frisch Labor Supply, and the Con-
sumption Multiplier of Government Spending: One Solution to a Fiscal Policy Puz-
zle. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 43(1):221–251.
Bils, M. and Klenow, P. J. (2004). Some Evidence on the Importance of Sticky Prices.
Journal of Political Economy, 112(5):947–985.
Biolsi, C. (2017). Nonlinear Effects of Fiscal Policy over the Business Cycle. Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control, 78:54–87.
Blanchard, O. and Perotti, R. (2002). An Empirical Characterization of the Dynamic
Effects of Changes in Government Spending and Taxes on Output. the Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 117(4):1329–1368.
Boero, G., Smith, J., and Wallis, K. F. (2015). The Measurement and Characteristics
of Professional Forecasters’ Uncertainty. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 30(7):1029–
1046.
Bok, B., Caratelli, D., Giannone, D., Sbordone, A. M., and Tambalotti, A. (2018).
Macroeconomic Nowcasting and Forecasting with Big Data. Annual Review of Eco-
nomics, 10:615–643.
Bomberger, W. A. (1996). Disagreement as a Measure of Uncertainty. Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking, 28(3):381–392.
Bouakez, H. and Rebei, N. (2007). Why does Private Consumption Rise after a Govern-
ment Spending Shock? Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne d’économique,
40(3):954–979.
Brinca, P., Faria-e Castro, M., Homem Ferreira, M., and Holter, H. (2019). The Non-
linear Effects of Fiscal Policy. FRB St. Louis Working Paper, (2019-15).
Burnside, C., Eichenbaum, M., and Fisher, J. D. (2004). Fiscal Shocks and Their Con-
sequences. Journal of Economic Theory, 115(1):89–117.
Caggiano, G., Castelnuovo, E., Colombo, V., and Nodari, G. (2015). Estimating Fiscal
Multipliers: News from a Non-Linear World. The Economic Journal, 125(584):746–
776.
154
Caggiano, G., Castelnuovo, E., and Groshenny, N. (2014). Uncertainty Shocks and
Unemployment Dynamics in US Recessions. Journal of Monetary Economics, 67:78–
92.
Campbell, J. R., Evans, C. L., Fisher, J. D., Justiniano, A., Calomiris, C. W., and Wood-
ford, M. (2012). Macroeconomic Effects of Federal Reserve Forward Guidance [with
Comments and Discussion]. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, pages 1–80.
Carroll, C. D. (2003). Macroeconomic Expectations of Households and Professional
Forecasters. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1):269–298.
Castelnuovo, E. and Pellegrino, G. (2018). Uncertainty-Dependent Effects of Monetary
Policy Shocks: A New-Keynesian Interpretation. Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control.
Cesa-Bianchi, A., Thwaites, G., and Vicondoa, A. (2020). Monetary Policy Transmis-
sion in the United Kingdom: A High Frequency Identification Approach. European
Economic Review, 123:103375.
Champagne, J. and Sekkel, R. (2018). Changes in Monetary Regimes and the Iden-
tification of Monetary Policy Shocks: Narrative Evidence from Canada. Journal of
Monetary Economics, 99:72–87.
Christiano, L., Eichenbaum, M., and Rebelo, S. (2011). When is the Government
Spending Multiplier Large? Journal of Political Economy, 119(1):78–121.
Christiano, L. J., Eichenbaum, M., and Evans, C. (1996). The Effects of Monetary
Policy Shocks: Some Evidence from the Flow of Funds. The Review of Economics and
Statistics, 78(1):16–34.
Christiano, L. J., Eichenbaum, M., and Evans, C. L. (1999). Monetary Policy Shocks:
What Have We Learned and to What End? Handbook of Macroeconomics, 1:65–148.
Cloyne, J. and Hürtgen, P. (2016). The Macroeconomic Effects of Monetary Policy: A
New Measure for the United Kingdom. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,
8(4):75–102.
155
Cochrane, J. H. and Piazzesi, M. (2002). The Fed and Interest Rates – A High-
Frequency Identification. American Economic Review, 92(2):90–95.
Cogan, J. F., Cwik, T., Taylor, J. B., and Wieland, V. (2010). New Keynesian versus
Old Keynesian Government Spending Multipliers. Journal of Economic Dynamics and
control, 34(3):281–295.
Coibion, O., Gorodnichenko, Y., Kueng, L., and Silvia, J. (2017). Innocent Bystanders?
Monetary Policy and Inequality. Journal of Monetary Economics, 88:70–89.
Coibion, O., Gorodnichenko, Y., and Kumar, S. (2018a). How do Firms Form Their
Expectations? New Survey Evidence. American Economic Review, 108(9):2671–2713.
Coibion, O., Gorodnichenko, Y., Kumar, S., and Pedemonte, M. (2018b). Inflation
Expectations as a Policy Tool? Technical report, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
d’Alessandro, A., Fella, G., and Melosi, L. (2019). Fiscal Stimulus with Learning-by-
Doing. International Economic Review, 60(3):1413–1432.
D’Amico, S. and Orphanides, A. (2008). Uncertainty and Disagreement in Economic
Forecasting. Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2008-56, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (U.S.), revised 2008.
Dincer, N., Eichengreen, B., and Geraats, P. (2019). Transparency of Monetary Policy
in the Postcrisis World. The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Central Banking, page
287.
Dovern, J., Fritsche, U., and Slacalek, J. (2012). Disagreement Among Forecasters in
G7 Countries. Review of Economics and Statistics, 94(4):1081–1096.
Edelberg, W., Eichenbaum, M., and Fisher, J. D. (1999). Understanding the Effects of
a Shock to Government Purchases. Review of Economic Dynamics, 2(1):166–206.
Falck, E., Hoffmann, M., and Hürtgen, P. (2019). Disagreement about Inflation Expec-
tations and Monetary Policy Transmission. Journal of Monetary Economics.
Fatás, A. and Mihov, I. (2001). The Effects of Fiscal Policy on Consumption and
Employment: Theory and Evidence. CEPR Discussion Paper, 2760.
156
Frisch, R. and Waugh, F. V. (1933). Partial Time Regressions as Compared with Indi-
vidual Trends. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 387–401.
Furlanetto, F. (2011). Fiscal Stimulus and the Role of Wage Rigidity. Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, 35(4):512–527.
Galí, J. (2015). Monetary Policy, Inflation, and the Business Cycle: An Introduction to the
New Keynesian Framework and its Applications. Princeton University Press.
Galí, J., López-Salido, J. D., and Vallés, J. (2007). Understanding the Effects of Gov-
ernment Spending on Consumption. Journal of the European Economic Association,
5(1):227–270.
Galvão, A. B. C. (2006). Structural Break Threshold VARs for Predicting US Recessions
Using the Spread. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 21(4):463–487.
Ganelli, G. and Tervala, J. (2009). Can Government Spending Increase Private Con-
sumption? The Role of Complementarity. Economics Letters, 103(1):5–7.
Geraats, P. M. (2002). Central Bank Transparency. The Economic Journal, 112(483):F532–
F565.
Gertler, M. and Karadi, P. (2015). Monetary Policy Surprises, Credit Costs, and Eco-
nomic Activity. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 7(1):44–76.
Giordani, P. and Söderlind, P. (2003). Inflation Forecast Uncertainty. European Economic
Review, 47(6):1037–1059.
Gordon, R. J. and Krenn, R. (2010). The End of the Great Depression: VAR Insight on
the Roles of Monetary and Fiscal Policy. NBER Working paper, 16380:183–231.
Granger, C. W. and Terasvirta, T. (1993). Modelling Non-Linear Economic Relation-
ships. Oxford University Press.
Grimme, C., Henzel, S. R., and Wieland, E. (2014). Inflation Uncertainty Revisited: A
Proposal for Robust Measurement. Empirical Economics, 47(4):1497–1523.
Hurst, E. (2003). Grasshoppers, Ants, and Pre-Retirement Wealth: A Test of Perma-
nent Income. NBER Working Papers, 10098.
157
Jacob, P. (2015). Deep Habits, Price Rigidities, and the Consumption Response to
Government Spending. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 47(2-3):481–510.
Jordà, Ò. (2005). Estimation and Inference of Impulse Responses by Local Projections.
American Economic review, 95(1):161–182.
Jurado, K., Ludvigson, S. C., and Ng, S. (2015). Measuring Uncertainty. The American
Economic Review, 105(3):1177–1216.
Klenow, P. J. and Kryvtsov, O. (2008). State-Dependent or Time-Dependent Pric-
ing: Does It Matter for Recent US Inflation? The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
123(3):863–904.
Koop, G., Pesaran, M. H., and Potter, S. M. (1996). Impulse Response Analysis in
Nonlinear Multivariate Models. Journal of Econometrics, 74(1):119–147.
Kozeniauskas, N., Orlik, A., and Veldkamp, L. (2018). What are Uncertainty Shocks?
Journal of Monetary Economics, 100:1–15.
Lahiri, K. and Sheng, X. (2010). Measuring Forecast Uncertainty by Disagreement:
The Missing Link. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 25(4):514–538.
Leeper, E. M., Walker, T. B., and Yang, S.-C. S. (2013). Fiscal Foresight and Information
Flows. Econometrica, 81(3):1115–1145.
Linnemann, L. and Schabert, A. (2004). Can Fiscal Spending Stimulate Private Con-
sumption? Economics Letters, 82(2):173–179.
Lo, M. C. and Piger, J. M. (2005). Is the Response of Output to Monetary Policy
Asymmetric? Evidence from A Regime-Switching Coefficients Model. Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking, 37(5):865–886.
Lorenzoni, G. (2009). A Theory of Demand Shocks. American Economic Review,
99(5):2050–84.
Lovell, M. C. (1963). Seasonal Adjustment of Economic Time Series and Multiple
Regression Analysis. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 58(304):993–1010.
Lucas, R. E. (1972). Expectations and the Neutrality of Money. Journal of Economic
Theory, 4(2):103–124.
158
Maćkowiak, B. and Wiederholt, M. (2009). Optimal Sticky Prices under Rational Inat-
tention. The American Economic Review, 99(3):769–803.
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